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Abstract: It is common knowledge that privacy in the market and the 
media is protected less in the United States than in Europe. Since the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it has become obvious that the right 
to privacy in the government sphere too is protected less in the United 
States than in Europe. This Article brings alive the legal difference by 
considering the case—real in the United States, hypothetical in Europe— 
of a spy agency’s database of call records, created for the purpose of iden-
tifying potential terrorists. Under U.S. law such an antiterrorism database 
might very well be legal. But under European law the very same database 
would clearly be illegal. Numerous barriers to transatlantic cooperation 
on fighting terrorism and cross-border crime have been created by this 
legal difference. The Article considers the reasons for the transatlantic 
difference—surprising in view of the common wisdom that Americans are 
more suspicious of government interferences with individual liberty than 
are Europeans. Based on the transatlantic comparison, this Article con-
cludes with a number of recommendations for the reform of U.S. infor-
mation privacy law, chief among them being the creation of an inde-
pendent privacy agency. 
Introduction 
 On April 9, 1940, the Nazis occupied Norway.1 In May 1944, seek-
ing to bolster the German army in the face of the mounting Allied 
offensive, the Nazis decided to conscript Norwegian men of fighting 
age into the army.2 Men born in three different years were to be sent 
to the Eastern Front.3 For this purpose, Norwegian government files 
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containing names, addresses, the sex, dates of birth, and other per-
sonal information on the population were to be used.4 When the 
Norwegian resistance learned of the plan, they attempted to destroy 
the files, unsuccessfully.5 So these resistance fighters turned to ma-
chines that were to be used to sort, by age cohort, the files—only two 
of which existed in Norway.6 They destroyed both.7 Without the ability 
to tabulate the population data, a Norwegian draft was too difficult to 
put into effect and the Nazi plan had to be dropped.8 
 This story and countless others, with less-happy endings, underpin 
the law of information privacy in Europe today. The dangers of any 
large-scale government effort to collect, catalogue, and manipulate in-
formation on individuals are never far-fetched. Preventing them is the 
object of European privacy law. 
 Americans have never suffered the same disastrous abuses of their 
personal records as did Europeans during World War II. Perhaps that is 
why American law is so much more complacent than European law in 
the face of massive government databases of personal records. One re-
cent illustration of this transatlantic difference is the revelation, in May 
2006, of a National Security Agency (“NSA”) database with the phone 
records of millions of ordinary American citizens.9 Ever since Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the NSA has been receiving the call records of at least one 
major telecommunications provider for purposes of an antiterrorism 
data-mining program.10 Even though the discovery provoked public 
uproar, whether the law was broken is entirely unclear.11 In most Euro-
pean countries, had such a data-mining program come to light, the 
outrage would have been not only political but also legal: the spy 
agency would be acting in flagrant disregard of the law.12 
 In Europe, such a program would have to be authorized by a pub-
lic law or regulation. It would have to be reviewed, in advance, by an 
independent privacy agency.13 Even though a European spy agency 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See Bing, supra note 1, at 114–23. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA Today, May 
11, 2006, at A1. 
10 See id. 
11 See infra notes 134–137, 160–168 and accompanying text (discussing the legality of 
the NSA call records program). 
12 See infra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. 
13 See, e.g., Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 11, Journal Officiel de la République Fran-
çaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of 
 
2007] A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining 611 
might be permitted access to the same type of call data, it would not 
be allowed to store the data for as long as the NSA has—over five 
years now.14 The data could be mined only for certain statutorily pre-
scribed “serious” threats and, in the case of terrorism, only if there 
were an “imminent and specific endangerment” from the threat.15 It 
could be passed on to law enforcement agencies only if a certain fac-
tual threshold had been met for suspecting an individual of having 
committed, or planning to commit, one of those serious offenses.16 
The same independent agency would have enforcement and oversight 
powers to guarantee that the program was being run in accordance 
with the law.17 Individuals would have a right—albeit subject to nu-
merous exceptions—to check on their personal data, to ensure that it 
was being used lawfully.18 
 This Article explores the European law of data protection and ex-
plains why a government data-mining program like the NSA’s would 
run afoul of that law.19 The comparative exercise serves many purposes. 
By taking the same set of facts and comparing how those facts would 
fare in two different legal systems—American and European—the dif-
ferences between their laws are brought into sharp focus. Considering a 
concrete set of facts is especially valuable in this area of law because 
many European data protection rules are framed in such abstract terms 
that it is difficult to appreciate how, in the hands of regulators and 
courts, they serve to curb government action. 
 Beyond description, this comparison has far-reaching ramifications 
for transatlantic cooperation on fighting crime and protecting national 
security. This Article draws out the many points of difference between 
information privacy law in Europe and the United States. Because of 
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the difference, European authorities are prohibited, by law, from shar-
ing intelligence on a routine basis with their American counterparts.20 
Only an agreement between Europe and the United States, under 
which the United States commits to an equivalent level of data protec-
tion, can overcome the legal barrier to information exchange.21 And to 
date, it has been impossible to reach such an agreement.22 Not only has 
transatlantic cooperation been stymied, but predictions of regulatory 
convergence between Europe and the United States have failed, quite 
spectacularly, in this area.23 Conflicts between regulatory systems have 
not resulted in convergence, but rather have been resolved through 
ordinary territoriality principles: when the territory or resource to 
which access is sought is American, American rules prevail; when it is 
European, European rules prevail. 
 The last aim of this comparison is to encourage critical reflection 
on American law. When it comes to information privacy, liberty is pro-
tected more in Europe than in the United States. This observation goes 
against the grain of recent privacy scholarship: in that view, American 
privacy law protects individual liberty against the state while European 
privacy law promotes dignity in interpersonal relations.24 But, as this 
Article’s analysis demonstrates, privacy law in Europe also protects lib-
erty and, in the context of antiterrorism data mining, does so more 
than American law. The difference is even more striking in light of the 
near-identical statutes adopted on both sides of the Atlantic in the early 
1970s—a single regulatory solution to what, at the time, was considered 
to be a common policy problem of protecting individual privacy in the 
age of information technology.25 A number of factors have contributed 
to this progressive divergence: the absence of an agency committed to 
privacy policy in the American regulatory scheme; the rise of executive 
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power in the United States at the very same time that the power of na-
tional executives in Europe is being checked, more and more, by the 
law of multiple Europe-wide political communities; and the influence 
of the Nazi experience on contemporary European human rights law. 
 By expanding the realm of legal possibilities, comparison can serve 
as an impetus for legal change at home. Wholesale borrowing from 
Europe would be misguided; a full-fledged constitutional right to in-
formation privacy and a cross-cutting law regulating information pri-
vacy in both the private and public sectors would be unlikely to achieve 
the desired result of curbing government data mining. Rather, this Ar-
ticle recommends a number of changes to the U.S. Privacy Act of 
1974.26 Although the intent of its drafters was to curb information pri-
vacy abuses by government actors across the board, the recent experi-
ence with data-mining programs demonstrates that the original ambi-
tion has been disappointed. Amending the Privacy Act would increase 
the transparency of data mining, enhance the public debate on the pri-
vacy costs of government programs, place some fairly modest limits on 
the government’s use of personal data, and improve oversight and en-
forcement. The European experience sheds light on what, in the origi-
nal transatlantic regulatory scheme, has worked well and deserves— 
once again—to become part of American privacy law. 
 The rest of this Article is organized as follows. In Part I, the NSA 
call database is described in more detail.27 This is followed by an over-
view in Part II of three sets of legal categories that are relevant, albeit in 
different permutations, to the analysis on both sides of the Atlantic.28 
Part III considers the applicable U.S. constitutional and statutory law 
and concludes that the President might very well have lawfully author-
ized the call database.29 Part IV sets out the European law that would 
apply to that same data-mining program if conducted by a European 
spy agency, and reveals how the program would come into conflict with 
the law.30 Finally, Part V explores the consequences of the comparison, 
both for transatlantic relations and for understanding American privacy 
law.31 
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I. The NSA Call Records Program 
 These are the details of the NSA call records program that have 
been revealed so far.32 Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the NSA approached the country’s major tele-
communications carriers, asking them to hand over their customers’ 
calling records and to update those records periodically. The NSA 
sought information on all calls made and received: to whom, from 
whom, when, and for how long. Customers were identified only by their 
phone numbers, not by their names, but a quick search of any public 
directory readily matches the phone number with the name. It is uncer-
tain which of the telecommunications companies complied with the re-
quest because of the secrecy of the program. From the newspaper ac-
counts, however, it appears that AT&T, the largest American telecom-
munications company, cooperated, as did Verizon’s subsidiary MCI. If 
this is true, the database contains information on tens of millions of 
Americans. The NSA has been “mining” the database to identify possi-
ble terrorists. 
 Databases can be put to many different uses. Most simply, a data-
base can organize large amounts of information so that, at a later time, 
that information can be retrieved easily. Statistical software can be ap-
plied to the data in the system. Data mining is probably one of the most 
sophisticated, technologically speaking, of the possible uses of data. In 
the words of one helpful explanation for nonspecialists: 
 Many simpler analytical tools utilize a verification-based ap-
proach, where the user develops a hypothesis and then tests 
the data to prove or disprove the hypothesis. For example, a 
user might hypothesize that a customer who buys a hammer, 
will also buy a box of nails. The effectiveness of this approach 
can be limited by the creativity of the user to develop various 
hypotheses, as well as the structure of the software being used. 
In contrast, data mining utilizes a discovery approach, in 
which algorithms can be used to examine several multidimen-
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sional data relationships simultaneously, identifying those that 
are unique or frequently represented. For example, a hard-
ware store may compare their customers’ tools purchases with 
home ownership, type of automobile driven, age, occupation, 
income and/or distance between residence and the store. As 
a result of its complex capabilities, two precursors are impor-
tant for a successful data-mining exercise; a clear formulation 
of the problem to be solved, and access to the relevant data.33 
For the hardware store, the problem is picking out those consumers 
likely to buy hammers and nails. For the Department of Health and 
Human Services, it is detecting welfare fraud. And, for the NSA, it is 
spotting likely terrorists. 
 Mining the data is only one part of the process. The data must first 
be collected, generally from many different databases. It must then be 
cleaned, to improve the quality of the data. This can 
involve the removal of duplicate records, normalizing the val-
ues used to represent information in the database (e.g., ensur-
ing that “no” is represented as a 0 throughout the database, 
and not sometimes as a 0, sometimes as a N, etc.), accounting 
for missing data points, removing unneeded date fields, iden-
tifying anomalous data points (e.g., an individual whose age is 
shown as 142 years), and standardizing data formats (e.g., 
changing dates so they all include MM/DD/YYYY).34 
Care must be taken to render different databases and data-mining soft-
ware interoperable. Only then can data mining be expected to gener-
ate valid results.35 
 How the call records are being mined by the NSA is unclear. Ac-
cording to some reports, only calls involving known or suspected Al 
Qaeda affiliates are targeted.36 By analyzing suspected terrorists’ call 
records, the NSA can gain insight into their activities, learn of possi-
ble terrorist plots, and identify other individuals who might be col-
laborating with Al Qaeda. The possibility, however, that more general 
criteria are being used to mine the data has not been ruled out. For 
instance, the NSA might analyze phone numbers with calls to or from 
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the Middle East and located in geographic areas known to be Muslim 
communities. 
 What happens afterwards with the phone numbers identified as 
likely terrorist numbers is also unclear. One possibility is that the in-
formation is used by the NSA or other government agencies to under-
take more intrusive surveillance, for instance, eavesdropping on phone 
lines. Another possibility is that the pool of suspects is further narrowed 
by matching the suspicious phone numbers with other records such as 
credit card histories, financial information, and airline passenger re-
cords. Given the secretive nature of the database, these are, at best, in-
formed guesses; the NSA’s data-mining methods are unlikely to be re-
vealed anytime soon. 
 The NSA call records database is just one of many antiterrorism 
data-mining initiatives that have come to light since September 11.37 
The most notorious is “Total Information Awareness,” later renamed 
“Terrorism Information Awareness” in response to public criticism and 
ultimately defunded by Congress.38 The goal of Total Information 
Awareness was to combine all electronic information available on indi-
viduals—like Internet purchases, airline passenger data, and driver re-
cords—to single out terrorism suspects.39 Others include the Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (“CAPPS II”), now called Secure 
Flight, designed to match airline passenger records with other data to 
stop likely terrorists from boarding airplanes;40 the Multistate Antiter-
rorism Information Exchange (“MATRIX”) Pilot Project, which seeks to 
combine information from a variety of databases, including state law 
enforcement records, to assist with criminal investigations;41 and the 
Department of the Treasury’s acquisition, for data-mining purposes, of 
all records on international money transfers held by the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”).42 In the 
interest of brevity and clarity, the comparative legal analysis in this Arti-
cle focuses on a call records program undertaken by a spy agency. But 
the analysis is also relevant to the many other antiterrorism data-mining 
programs that have surfaced in the past couple of years. To be sure, the 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Seifert, supra note 33, at 5–17. 
38 Daniel J. Solove, Marc Rotenberg & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy 
Law 604 (2d ed. 2006). 
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statutory and constitutional specifics differ, especially in the United 
States, but the fundamental principles of the two legal systems and their 
points of contrast remain the same. 
 Based on what legal authority did the NSA embark on its data-
mining mission? The agency was created by a secret executive memo-
randum in 1952.43 It was to be the sole foreign intelligence agency re-
sponsible for intercepting communications, what is generally called sig-
nals intelligence in contrast to human intelligence.44 The NSA was also 
placed under the organizational umbrella of the Department of De-
fense.45 In the years since 1952, the NSA has become a critical element 
of the intelligence community. It has extraordinarily powerful and so-
phisticated computing facilities, with the capacity to intercept and ana-
lyze any type of communication, anywhere in the world.46 The NSA is 
the agency responsible for some of today’s most notorious spy programs: 
ECHELON,47 warrantless wiretapping of international phone calls,48 
and, of course, the call database. 
 Originally, the NSA was exempted from all regulation curbing the 
government’s intelligence activities.49 In the aftermath of Watergate, 
however, Congress enacted legislation specifically targeted at the NSA’s 
intelligence gathering—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (“FISA”).50 Later, in Executive Order 12,888, President Reagan set 
down surveillance guidelines for the entire intelligence community, 
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including the NSA.51 Some of these restrictions are explored below. As 
this Article shows, however, they are largely ineffective against collec-
tion and use of personal data that do not entail the interception of wire 
or electronic communications. 
 As for the call records program, it was most likely authorized by a 
secret presidential directive. The President has not yet spelled out the 
legal grounds for the directive, but they are likely to be similar to those 
advanced in support of the warrantless wiretapping program uncovered 
in December 2005.52 In a white paper submitted to Congress, the ad-
ministration made two legal arguments in support of warrantless wire-
tapping: it was a lawful exercise of the President’s constitutional powers 
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and it was authorized by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (the “AUMF”), enacted by 
Congress in the immediate aftermath of September 11.53 According to 
the administration, the President’s constitutional duty to serve as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and to prevent armed at-
tacks against the nation includes the power to conduct warrantless sur-
veillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.54 In 
the AUMF, Congress authorized the President “to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorists 
attacks” of September 11 to prevent “any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States.”55 The administration maintains 
that Congress intended for the statute to cover not only conventional 
military operations but also domestic electronic surveillance: such activ-
ity is necessary to identify the enemy and to foil future terrorist at-
tacks.56 Both of these arguments can also be made in support of the call 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, pt. 1.12(b) (Dec. 4, 1981). 
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database: by ordering the creation of the call database, the President 
furthered his constitutional duty to protect national security and took 
the steps necessary to prevent “any future acts of international terror-
ism,” as instructed by Congress in the AUMF.57 
 Since the discovery of the call records program, a number of law-
suits have been filed in federal court against the telecommunications 
providers and the government.58 In addition, complaints against the 
providers have been filed with telecommunications regulators in over 
twenty states.59 The telecommunications companies and the govern-
ment, however, have already successfully defended two of these cases by 
invoking the state secrets privilege.60 This privilege protects informa-
tion related to national security from disclosure because of the possible 
harm to national defense and to the success of future intelligence-
gathering operations.61 In the two cases in which the courts have found 
in favor of the privilege, the plaintiffs’ claims had to be dismissed be-
cause, without court-ordered discovery, it would be impossible for them 
to prove any of their claims.62 Thus, it might very well be that, as a re-
sult of the state secrets privilege, the lawfulness of the call records pro-
gram will never be decided by the courts. 
II. Some Initial Transatlantic Comparisons 
 How convincing is the President’s legal defense of the NSA call 
database? As we shall see, plausible. But before launching into a de-
tailed discussion of the legal framework, a few distinctions, important 
to the analysis on both sides of the Atlantic, should be borne in mind. 
 The first is the difference between the content of communications 
and the incidents of communications. Incidents of communications 
include facts such as who was called, when, and for how long. This is 
significant for examining the government’s interference with privacy in 
the United States, but considerably less so in Europe. In the United 
States, the content of, say, a telephone call or an email message is ex-
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58 See generally In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1332 
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tensively protected under constitutional and statutory law, but the inci-
dents are not, especially when gathered after the communication has 
occurred.63 In Europe, the collection of both types of data is consid-
ered an interference with the fundamental right to privacy.64 Even in 
Europe, however, government surveillance is generally considered 
more intrusive in the case of content data and therefore more difficult 
to justify in the face of a legal challenge.65 
 The second distinction is the one drawn between communications 
data and all types of personal data. Because letters, phone conversa-
tions, emails, and other types of communications are believed to be 
more revealing of one’s self than a decision to purchase a book on the 
Internet, for example, the government’s ability to obtain the former 
kind of personal data is covered by separate, more stringent regulation 
on both sides of the Atlantic.66 Where Europe and the United States 
part ways is on their treatment of “all types of personal data.”67 With 
respect to personal data processing by government actors, the U.S. le-
gal framework is far less demanding than the European one.68 As for 
the private sector, an all-encompassing category for “all types of per-
sonal data” does not exist in the United States. Rather, uses of specific 
types of personal data are regulated, including health information, 
video store records, financial information, and so on.69 By contrast, in 
European law, all personal data processing is treated as potentially 
problematic, even when undertaken by private actors.70 
 The last important distinction regards not the type of personal 
data collected, but the government purposes for which it is collected. 
The law in both the United States and Europe treats information gath-
ering for purposes of law enforcement differently from information 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
64 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(a). 
65 See id. art. 6. 
66 See, e.g., Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.) (stating that “[t]he con-
fidentiality of letters, as well as the confidentiality of post and telecommunications is invio-
lable”); Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
67 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(a) (defining “personal data” 
as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual”). 
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (regulating the collection and use of 
personal information by government actors). 
69 The government’s use of many of these same types of personal data is also afforded 
special regulatory treatment. See, e.g., Fair Credit Report Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000 & 
Supp. III 2003); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000 & Supp. III 
2003). 
70 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3. 
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gathering for purposes of protecting national security.71 The former is 
regulated more stringently than the latter because of the different aims 
and consequences of the two types of government activities.72 Criminal 
investigations are relatively narrow in scope—their focus is a specific 
past or imminent future event. By contrast, agencies charged with pro-
tecting national security must monitor a wide, inchoate range of indi-
viduals and activities that might, sometime in the future, threaten the 
well-being of the population. Furthermore, the purpose of a criminal 
investigation is to prosecute and convict individuals, with draconian 
consequences for their life and liberty interests. By contrast, criminal 
prosecutions are tangential to what national security agencies do. They 
do not have arrest powers, but instead must refer cases to the police if a 
plot is so far advanced that arrest and prosecution are warranted.73 The 
mission of such agencies is to thwart the most dangerous types of 
threats—often turning a blind eye to routine crime—and to do so us-
ing a variety of tactics.74 The targets of national security surveillance, 
therefore, are not as likely to be detained and imprisoned as are those 
of police investigations. Their rights are clearly compromised, but not 
as directly as with criminal investigations. 
 Again, Europe and the United States differ as to how they further 
parse the categories. On the national security side, European legal sys-
tems are designed to ward off two types of threats: domestic and for-
eign. One agency is responsible for gathering intelligence abroad on 
threats posed by foreign governments—in the old days, the Soviet Un-
ion. Another agency is charged with gathering intelligence at home, on 
activities sponsored by foreign powers (counter-intelligence) as well as 
on home-grown security threats.75 In the past, those home-grown 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in 
the Wake of 9/11, at 163–97 (2006) (discussing methods of organizing intelligence in 
different countries). 
72 See id. at 173–75 (describing difference between law enforcement and national secu-
rity functions). 
73 See id. at 170 (discussing the role of MI5 agents in England). 
74 See id. at 174 (characterizing intelligence as “threat—rather than case—oriented” as 
compared to criminal investigations). 
75 In Germany, there are two main sets of national security agencies: the Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or “BfV”) and the BfV’s 
counterparts at the Land (state) level, responsible for domestic intelligence; and the Fed-
eral Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or “BND”), responsible for foreign intel-
ligence. See Shlomo Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms in the Control of Intelli-
gence Services in the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 545, 550–51 (1998); see also Fran-
çois Thuillier, L’Europe du Secret: Mythes et Réalité du Reseignement Politique 
Interne 18 (2000). The structure of the security services in France is even more compli-
cated. Intelligence on home-grown security threats is handled by a department of the Na-
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threats came from extremist and separatist terrorist groups like the 
Bader Meinhof and the Irish Republican Army; today, they include 
radical-Islam terrorist cells. Both sets of agencies operate under far less 
cumbersome procedural guidelines than do the police. Oversight is 
generally entrusted not to the judiciary but to the legislative and execu-
tive branches. Specifically, both sets of agencies are covered by the 
more permissive surveillance regimes discussed in Part IV on European 
law—permissive, that is, compared to police surveillance for purposes 
of criminal prosecutions.76 
 By contrast, in the United States, national security is perceived 
mostly as security from foreign powers abroad, not from internal 
threats, and especially not from home-grown internal threats. On the 
bureaucratic level, there are no domestic counterparts to the country’s 
foreign intelligence agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (the 
“CIA”) for human intelligence and the NSA for signals intelligence. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) is charged with both 
criminal investigations of violations of federal law and domestic intelli-
gence operations.77 Those domestic operations, moreover, are directed 
against activities sponsored by foreign governments or groups, not by 
domestic ones. The rules for national security surveillance, set down in 
FISA, are largely responsible for this institutional state of affairs.78 As 
the name suggests, the statute applies only when the government seeks 
to obtain foreign—not domestic—intelligence within the United States: 
its rules are triggered when the target of the investigation is a “foreign 
power” or an “agent of a foreign power.”79 
 In fact, until recently, the FBI’s paradigm for both domestic intelli-
gence operations and criminal investigations has been a more rights-
abiding law enforcement model, not a national security model.80 This is 
                                                                                                                      
tional Police, the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (“DCRG”). There is also an 
antiterrorist section of the National Police: the Division Nationale Anti-Terroriste (“DNAT”). 
It is responsible for investigating and preventing all terrorist activities in France. Domestic 
intelligence on security threats encouraged by foreign powers is handled by the Direction de 
la Surveillance du Territoire (“DST”). See Thuillier, supra, at 112–13. The Direction Générale 
de la Securité Extérieure (“DGSE”) is France’s classic spy agency, responsible for gathering 
signals and human intelligence outside France. See id. at 185. 
76 See infra notes 169–340 and accompanying text. 
77 See Posner, supra note 71, at 176 (discussing the hybrid nature of the FBI). 
78 See FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1811, 
1821–1829, 1841–1846, 1861–1862 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006)). 
79 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). 
80 See Jacqueline Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative 
Study of the United States and Germany 35–36 (SSRN, Working Paper No. 909010, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909010. 
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the product of the organizational culture that developed in the 1970s 
in response to congressional investigations into the FBI’s secret surveil-
lance of civil rights leaders and other political activists.81 As Jacqueline 
Ross explains, under the FBI guidelines crafted in the 1970s for domes-
tic security investigations 
the FBI [was] to restrict domestic intelligence operations to 
the investigation of individuals or groups who not only violate 
civil rights or seek to interfere with or overthrow the govern-
ment, but who do so through activities that “involve or will in-
volve the violation of federal law” as well as “the use of force 
or violence.” Thus the standard for proper covert operations 
in the intelligence arena became the criminal standard— re-
quiring some indication that criminal offenses were in the off-
ing.82 
Compared to Europe, more government investigations are regulated as 
policing than as defending against national security threats. This is true 
even today, notwithstanding all the revisions that have been made since 
September 11 to the FBI guidelines and FISA.83 
 The Nixon-era reluctance to allow national security operations to 
be directed against primarily domestic conspiracies also makes sense of 
a fundamental anomaly, as seen at least in European eyes, of the NSA 
call database: why is a program involving primarily individuals within 
the United States being handled by an agency created to gather foreign 
signals intelligence? Most of the calls, even the suspicious ones, involve 
individuals living in the United States whose formal ties to the United 
States are likely to be at least as strong as, if not stronger than, their ties 
to a foreign organization. In other words, the threat that one might 
hope to discover with such data mining is as likely to be a threat com-
ing from fundamentalist Islamic groups established inside the country, 
as from Al Qaeda operatives abroad. The answer to this puzzle is that 
the architecture of the legal system does not fully contemplate such 
investigations. In a place with one or more domestic security agencies, 
like Germany, France, or the United Kingdom, such a program would 
be handled by one of those bodies. But in the United States, the NSA 
was the only viable institutional candidate. 
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. 
82 Id. at 37. 
83 Id. at 38. For a description of the changes to FISA made by the USA PATRIOT Act 
and the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, see Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, 
supra note 38, at 288–309. 
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III. The United States: Legal Plausibility 
 Now for a detailed consideration of the law on the American side 
of the Atlantic. The law regulating data privacy is both constitutional 
and statutory. One statute in particular, the Privacy Act of 1974, re-
quires close scrutiny. 
A. U.S. Constitutional Law 
 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, generally the 
first line of defense against intrusive surveillance, does not apply in 
cases like the NSA call database.84 Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s case 
law, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy before the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and the related warrant requirement will apply.85 In 1967, in Katz 
v. United States, the Court held that individuals have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the content of their telephone conversations.86 But 
over a decade later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that individuals 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed 
from their telephones.87 Why? According to the Court, individuals 
know that the numbers dialed from their lines can be recorded by their 
providers and that, indeed, these numbers are routinely recorded for 
legitimate business purposes such as billing.88 Because callers know of 
this exposure to third parties, the Court reasoned, they cannot expect 
their dialing information to remain secret.89 In making telephone calls 
and doing business with telephone companies, subscribers “assume the 
risk” that their records will be exposed to others, including the police.90 
 This case law is the source of the distinction between content and 
incidental, or “envelope,” communications data.91 What is written in a 
letter—today, an email—and what is said in a telephone conversation 
are considered private. Warrantless government intrusions are believed 
                                                                                                                      
84 See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
85 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
86 Id. at 352. 
87 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 744. The assumption of the risk rationale was first used by the Supreme Court 
to deny Fourth Amendment protection to customer account information held by banks. 
See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
91 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother 
That Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 611 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Sur-
veillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1264, 1286 (2004). 
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to be obnoxious. By contrast, individuals cannot claim a privacy interest 
in those identifiers that are necessary for the communication to oc-
cur—the mailing address, the routing information, and the telephone 
numbers. That information is too “prosaic” for a constitutional privacy 
right to attach.92 Because the call records collected by the NSA fall into 
the noncontent category, they are not covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
 Nor would such information be protected under the Supreme 
Court’s substantive due process doctrine. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that certain types of personal decisions are constitutionally 
protected from government interference, as part of the right to “lib-
erty,” even though they are not specifically listed in the Bill of Rights. 
The most notorious of these personal decisions, of course, is abortion.93 
 In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court suggested that personal infor-
mation might also be constitutionally protected as a liberty interest.94 
The Court considered a challenge to a New York statute requiring phy-
sicians to report to the state Department of Health all prescriptions 
written for drugs with both medical and recreational uses—drugs like 
opium, cocaine, and marijuana.95 The Court rejected the challenge, 
but not before elaborating on the harm that disclosure of such medical 
information might cause patients and reviewing the various safeguards 
in place to prevent disclosure except when necessary to stop illegal 
drug abuse.96 Since Whalen, however, the Supreme Court has been si-
lent on the so-called “constitutional right to information privacy” and 
the federal circuits have come down differently on the very existence, 
as well as the contours, of the right.97 Even setting aside this uncer-
tainty, information on one’s phone calls would most likely not count as 
part of such a right. The Fourth Amendment case law on the lack of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is especially damning on this point.98 
In sum, even if there were an established right to information privacy, it 
is highly unlikely that call data would be covered by the right, and, even 
if it were covered, it is unlikely that the security measures in place to 
protect against unwarranted disclosures were so deficient as to render 
the NSA database unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                      
92 Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
93 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 508 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). 
94 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). 
95 Id. at 592–96. 
96 Id. at 593–95. 
97 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 400–02. 
98 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
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B. U.S. Statutory Law 
 Some of the lacunae in the Supreme Court’s case law have been 
filled by legislative enactments. Even though, therefore, the incidents 
of communications are not constitutionally shielded from government 
scrutiny, they do receive some protection under statute—albeit less pro-
tection than afforded the contents of communications. 
 Surveillance conducted for law enforcement is regulated sepa-
rately from surveillance conducted to protect national security against 
foreign powers.99 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the 
“ECPA”) of 1986 covers the former, and FISA the latter.100 Both have 
been amended significantly since their original enactment, most re-
cently by the USA PATRIOT Act.101 The ECPA consists of three separate 
acts: the Wiretap Act applies to the interception of the contents of 
communications like telephone calls and emails, as the communication 
is occurring;102 the Stored Communications Act applies to communica-
tions in electronic storage—for instance, an email on a server—as well 
as customer records held by telephone companies and Internet service 
providers;103 and the Pen Register Act applies to the installation of de-
vices that capture information on outgoing calls (pen registers) and 
incoming calls (trap-and-trace devices), as well as the use of “processes” 
that capture similar information on Internet users.104 The type of sur-
veillance contemplated by FISA parallels to some extent the ECPA’s 
scheme: the interception of communications105 and the installation of 
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, as well as their Internet equiva-
lents.106 FISA also sets down standards for a number of other types of 
information gathering, including physical searches of premises107 and 
access to physical records like library borrower lists.108 
                                                                                                                      
99 For an overview of the electronic surveillance law discussed in this section, see So-
love, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 267–97. 
100 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); FISA, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1811, 1821–
1829, 1841–1846, 1861–1862 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
101 The USA PATRIOT Act was passed in 2001 and recently reauthorized with amend-
ments. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (amended by USA PATRIOT Improve-
ment and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006)). 
102 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
103 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2000, Supp. III 2003 & Supp. IV 2004). 
104 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2000, Supp. III 2003 & Supp. IV 2004). 
105 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811. See generally Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Law, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1306, 1322–29 (2004). 
106 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841–1846 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
107 Id. §§ 1821–1829. 
108 Id. §§ 1861–1862. 
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 Collecting call data, quite obviously, is different from the intercep-
tion of the contents of a communication, either in transmission or in 
storage.109 Neither did the NSA install pen registers and trap-and-trace 
devices on individual phone lines to obtain the call data. The NSA used 
a far more efficient method: it piggy-backed off telecommunications 
providers, requesting that information already gathered in the course 
of routine business operations be transferred to the government.110 
Hence, the one piece of federal electronic surveillance law that does 
apply, squarely, to the kind of data involved in the NSA program is that 
part of the Stored Communications Act on customer records.111 
 The Stored Communications Act bans companies from disclosing 
customer records to the government,112 but then creates a number of 
exceptions to that ban.113 If the government obtains a warrant, a court 
order, or for certain categories of customer information, a specific type 
of administrative subpoena, then disclosure is permitted.114 The war-
rant and court order procedures must be used for ordinary criminal 
investigations, whereas the speedier administrative process may be used 
“in an authorized investigation to protect against international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities.”115 This type of administrative 
subpoena is known as a National Security Letter.116 If the Director of 
the FBI or his designee certifies that the customer records are being 
                                                                                                                      
109 The following discussion was informed by blog commentary by three experts on 
surveillance law. See OrinKerr.com, http://www.orinkerr.com (May 12, 2006, 03:30 EST); 
Posting of Peter Swire & Judd Legum to Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org/2006/ 
05/page/6 (May 11, 2006, 18:25 EST). 
110 See Cauley, supra note 9; Page, supra note 32. 
111 See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); see 
also Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000) (requiring telecommunications carriers 
to keep their customer information confidential). The duty of confidentiality, however, is 
subject to any disclosures required by law and therefore the analysis is similar to that under 
the Stored Communications Act. 
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The lawyers for the NSA might 
quibble that the NSA did not obtain information on a “subscriber to or customer of [an 
electronic communication] service,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)(1)–(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006), because it only obtained data on phone numbers, without the names of the cus-
tomers using those phone numbers. But the NSA request certainly comes within the spirit 
of the statute, given that the name of a subscriber can easily be identified based on her 
phone number and that the intent of the Act is to protect customer privacy. 
113 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c). 
114 See id. §§ 2702(c)(1), 2703(c)(1)–(2). The scheme for government access to finan-
cial records and credit reports is quite similar. 
115 Id. § 2709(b). This is the standard for federal administrative subpoenas. The statute, 
however, also contemplates administrative subpoenas issued by state entities and governed 
by state law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)–(d). 
116 Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 728–29. 
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requested for an investigation “to protect against international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities,” the telecommunications pro-
vider must hand over the information.117 Government access to cus-
tomer data, therefore, replicates the more general, two-track approach 
to surveillance—one track for law enforcement, the other for national 
security. Yet even though the call data was requested by the NSA for 
national security purposes, administrative subpoenas were not used. At 
first blush, therefore, it appears that the NSA, along with the telecom-
munications providers that collaborated with the NSA, violated the 
Stored Communications Act.118 
 What would be the consequences of such a violation? As it turns 
out, they are fairly paltry as compared to those for other types of viola-
tions, such as illegal wiretapping or illegal access to stored communica-
tions. There are no criminal penalties for breaching the customer data 
provisions.119 Against the telecommunications providers, individuals 
have a civil right of action for injunctive relief and damages, set at a 
statutory minimum of $1000 per individual.120 Against the government, 
there is a right of action for money damages, set at a minimum of 
$10,000 per person.121 
 Why, though, is this a violation only at first blush? Because the le-
gal analysis must take into account the President’s inherent constitu-
tional power, under Article II, to authorize the call database.122 And, as 
with the constitutional case law, the different treatment of the content 
of communications and the incidents of communications, in this case 
customer records, is critical: the legislative scheme is comprehensive 
with respect to the former, patchy on the latter. The President’s au-
thorization, therefore, might very well save the NSA program. 
 On this aspect of the legal analysis, it is useful to consider another 
NSA surveillance program—the warrantless wiretapping of telephone 
calls between individuals in the United States and individuals abroad. A 
                                                                                                                      
117 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b). 
118 The other circumstances under which a communications provider may lawfully dis-
close customer records are set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c)(2)–(6) (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006). From the information available in the media, it does not appear that the actions of 
the telecommunications providers would be covered by any of these provisions. As for the 
government, the statute contemplates two other means of obtaining the customer data, see 
id. § 2703(c)(1)(C)–(D), neither of which is relevant here. 
119 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (defining an offense as “access to a wire 
or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage”). 
120 Id. § 2707. 
121 Id. § 2712. 
122 See U.S. Const. art. II. 
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group of legal scholars has mounted a forceful argument against this 
program.123 They claim, for good reason, that the warrantless wiretap-
ping program is illegal.124 Their argument rests on Congress’s compre-
hensive regulation of content-based surveillance in the ECPA and 
FISA—both of which require a warrant.125 The argument: Because 
these statutes, by their express terms, cover the entire universe of gov-
ernment wiretapping, the President has no other legal avenue for au-
thorizing such wiretapping.126 He cannot rely on Congress’s later-in-
time AUMF because nothing in the broad, vague language of that stat-
ute suggests that Congress intended to override the explicit terms of 
the earlier surveillance statutes.127 Neither can the President rely on his 
Article II powers.128 According to Justice Jackson’s classic tripartite 
scheme of presidential powers in Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 
the President’s authority to act turns, in large measure, on whether 
Congress has acted.129 In Justice Jackson’s famous words: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for 
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. . . . 
                                                                                                                      
123 See generally Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to Congres-
sional Leadership in Response to Justice Department Letter of July 10, 2006 ( July 14, 
2006) [hereinafter July 14, 2006 Letter], available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/ 
pdf/lettertocongress7-14.pdf; Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to 
Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department Whitepaper of January 19, 
2006 (Feb. 2, 2006), reprinted in 85 Ind. L.J. 1415 (2006) [hereinafter Feb. 2, 2006 Letter]; 
Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in 
Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22, 2005 ( Jan. 9, 2006), reprinted in 85 
Ind. L.J. 1364 (2006) [hereinafter Jan. 9, 2006 Letter]. 
124 Indeed, the first federal court to decide the issue has held the program to be ille-
gal. See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
125 See, e.g., Feb. 2, 2006 Letter, supra note 123, at 1415; Jan. 9, 2006 Letter, supra note 
123, at 1364; see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (West 2000 & Supp. 
2006); 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1811, 1821–1829, 1841–1846, 1861–1862 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2006). 
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000) (“Procedures in this chapter [Wiretap Act] or 
chapter 121 [Stored Communications Act] and [FISA] shall be the exclusive means by 
which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception 
of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.”). The defini-
tion of both “electronic surveillance” and “interception of . . . communications” turns on 
access to the content of the communication. 
127 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). In Hamdan, the Supreme 
Court held that the AUMF could not be construed as overriding the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice’s requirements for military commissions. Id. 
128 July 14, 2006 Letter, supra note 123, at 4. 
129 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
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2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain. . . . 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest 
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in 
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon 
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclu-
sive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what 
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.130 
 Thus, in light of Congress’s express instruction to the government 
to obtain a warrant—from an ordinary court in the case of criminal 
investigations and from the FISA court in the case of foreign intelli-
gence—the President is at the “lowest ebb” of his powers in authorizing 
the warrantless surveillance program.131 To save the program, he must 
show that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers, an uphill battle, 
indeed, in view of Congress’s repeated and long-standing regulation of 
wire communications among states and between the United States and 
foreign nations under the Commerce Clause.132 The President must 
also convince the Supreme Court that his national security and foreign 
relations powers extend to activities at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment—telephone conversations conducted by Americans in the privacy 
of their homes.133 
 Justice Jackson’s analytic framework can also be applied to the 
NSA call records program. With this program, the administration is on 
firmer ground because of the different statutory and constitutional 
treatment of call records.134 Although Congress has comprehensively 
regulated the various circumstances under which the government can 
                                                                                                                      
130 Id. 
131 See July 14, 2006 Letter, supra note 123, at 4, 8; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–
38. 
132 See July 14, 2006 Letter, supra note 123, at 6–7 (explaining Congress’s authority to 
enact statutes dealing with wire and electronic communications systems). 
133 See Feb. 2, 2006 Letter, supra note 123, at 1422–23; Jan. 9, 2006 Letter, supra note 
123, at 1370–71. 
134 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2711 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
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listen to what is being said in telephone calls, it has not done the same 
for all the other information revealed by those calls.135 There is no 
equivalent provision on customer data that says the statutory proce-
dures are to be “the exclusive means” of government access to such 
data. In addition, government access that flouts the statutory proce-
dure is not criminalized. Thus, the President’s inherent constitutional 
power to authorize the call database is stronger than his power to au-
thorize warrantless wiretapping. In the former, he is acting in the less 
suspect “zone of twilight.”136 Moreover, in authorizing the collection of 
call data, the President does not interfere with a constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy.137 This difference is another reason why the call 
records program might survive a legal challenge even if the warrantless 
wiretapping program does not. 
 This is not to say that, even under the less-demanding constitu-
tional scrutiny of the “zone of twilight,” the President would have the 
authority to order the transfer of call records from private telecommu-
nications providers to the government. After all, the NSA database con-
tains information on millions of telephone calls, the vast majority of 
which involved U.S. citizens and occurred entirely within the United 
States.138 This type of government initiative is a far cry from what has 
been traditionally understood as a power incident to the President’s 
duty to protect the nation from foreign threats.139 But it is worthwhile 
to note the consequences of the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s com-
placency in the face of government access to customer records, records 
that sometimes can be just as revealing to government investigators— 
and as private to citizens—as what is actually said in the telephone con-
versation. 
C. The Privacy Act of 1974 
 Before concluding this discussion of U.S. law, one more piece of 
legislation should be mentioned. Once the calling records were trans-
ferred to the NSA, they were put in a database and mined for terror-
                                                                                                                      
135 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522. 
136 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
137 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
138 See Page, supra note 32. Unfortunately, because the government has not disclosed 
any information on the program and has invoked the state secrets privilege in litigation 
challenging the program, it is impossible to confirm these details. Cauley, supra note 9. 
139 For an overview of what has traditionally been considered inherent in the Presi-
dent’s Commander-in-Chief powers, see generally The Constitution of the United 
States: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 459–92 (2d Sess. 2002). 
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ists.140 The first place to which a European privacy advocate would 
turn, faced with a similar European data-mining program, would be 
her data protection law. In the United States, the analogue statute is 
the Privacy Act of 1974.141 The Privacy Act regulates the federal gov-
ernment’s collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal in-
formation.142 It imposes a number of duties on government agencies. 
First, the responsible agency must alert the public to the existence of 
a personal records system by publishing a notice in the Federal Regis-
ter.143 When information is collected from individuals, they must be 
told of the nature of the government database.144 The agency may 
gather only such information as is relevant and necessary to accom-
plishing the agency’s legal purposes set down by statute or executive 
order.145 Personal information must be accurate, relevant, timely, and 
complete.146 This information cannot be transferred to another gov-
ernment agency without the consent of the person concerned.147 
Technical measures must be adopted to guarantee the security and 
confidentiality of the information.148 Lastly, individuals have the right 
to check their personal information and, if necessary, demand that 
their information be corrected.149 
 Compared to the law on government surveillance canvassed ear-
lier, the reach of the Privacy Act is broader. It applies to the govern-
ment’s collection of all kinds of personal data, not just data related to 
one’s telephone conversations, and a couple of other types of data pro-
tected under separate statutes, such as bank account information.150 
What is more, in contrast with the focus on government collection of 
information in surveillance law, the Privacy Act regulates the govern-
ment’s use of personal data from start to finish: collection, storage, use 
and analysis, transfers to other parties, and modification to accommo-
date changes over time.151 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Cauley, supra note 9; Page, supra note 32. 
141 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Useful discussions of the Privacy Act can 
be found in Trudy Hayden & Jack Novik, Your Rights to Privacy 121–33 (1980), and 
Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 579–83. 
142 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
143 Id. § 552a(e)(4). 
144 Id. § 552a(e)(3). 
145 Id. § 552a(e)(1). 
146 Id. § 552a(e)(5). 
147 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
148 Id. § 552a(e)(10). 
149 Id. § 552a(d). 
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151 See id. § 552a. 
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 As will become evident, many of these guarantees parallel those of 
European privacy law. Yet the actual scope of individual rights under 
the Privacy Act is far more limited than under European laws. Most of 
the government’s duties are purely hortatory due to the limited en-
forcement mechanisms; a number of exceptions have been written into 
the Privacy Act; and the Privacy Act only applies to a narrow subset of 
what can be done, by the government, with personal information.152 
Consequently, what would be a European privacy advocate’s first line of 
defense against a government program involving such massive amounts 
of personal information turns out to be an entirely ineffective last re-
sort in the United States. 
 Some more detail on the limitations of the Privacy Act: The pri-
mary enforcement mechanism is a civil action in federal court, gener-
ally for damages.153 Yet individuals have a very difficult time establishing 
the injury necessary to recover for most violations of the statute—what 
court would award damages because a government agency asked too 
many questions, and too many irrelevant questions? Moreover, the Pri-
vacy Act is riddled with exceptions. Disclosure of information to other 
agencies is permitted even without consent if the public is notified up-
front, when the record system is created, that such disclosure consti-
tutes a “routine use” of the information.154 This is defined as a use that 
is compatible with the main purpose for which the information was col-
lected.155 Even without advance notice of a “routine use,” personal in-
formation may be transferred to another agency if the transfer is for 
law enforcement purposes and is requested by the agency’s head.156 
Records held by law enforcement agencies and the CIA may be ex-
empted from most of the requirements of the Privacy Act (“general ex-
emptions”) if the agency head publishes a notice to that effect.157 Re-
cords held by any agency may be exempted from some of the require-
ments of the Privacy Act (“specific exemptions”) if the agency head 
likewise publishes a notice to that effect and if the records fall into one 
of a number of categories—investigatory material, statistical records, 
matters whose secrecy is in the interest of national defense or foreign 
                                                                                                                      
152 For examples of exceptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (k). 
153 See Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 586; see also 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(g) (2000) (detailing civil remedies available for violations of the Privacy Act). 
154 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
155 Id. § 552a(a)(7). 
156 Id. § 552a(b)(7). 
157 Id. § 552a(j). 
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policy, and more.158 Finally, personal data held by the government is 
not considered a “system of records” covered by the Privacy Act unless 
the system is used by the agency to retrieve information about specific 
individuals using the names, social security numbers, or other identify-
ing particulars of those individuals.159 
 The call records program is a perfect illustration of the limitations 
of the Privacy Act. Unlike the FBI and the CIA, the NSA does not qual-
ify for a general exemption.160 In theory, therefore, the agency must 
comply with the bulk of the Privacy Act’s requirements.161 But Federal 
Register notices of NSA records systems generally take advantage of the 
specific exemptions for national security records.162 Plus, even without 
specific mention in the Federal Register, the NSA may share personal 
information with other government agencies if requested to do so for 
law enforcement purposes.163 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this 
analysis is the question of whether the call database would even count 
as a “system of records” under the Privacy Act.164 Is a phone number, 
without a name attached, an “identifying particular” assigned to an in-
dividual? If so, then it seems that searching the system by the phone 
number of an Al Qaeda suspect, to obtain information on her activities 
or to identify other possible suspects, would count as retrieving infor-
mation about her. But what about using the country code for Afghani-
stan as a search term? Or, as is most likely the case, combining these 
and other criteria as part of complex algorithms to discover new rela-
tionships among the data and to generate presumably a better, more 
accurate pool of terrorists and terrorist activity? The few courts to have 
decided the question of what is a “system of records” have reached dif-
ferent, inconsistent conclusions.165 And most of them have defined the 
term quite narrowly.166 Absurdly, therefore, a database containing per-
                                                                                                                      
158 Id. § 552a(k). 
159 See, e.g., Williams v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 104 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1997). 
160 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2000). 
161 See National Security Agency / Central Security Service Privacy Act Program, 32 
C.F.R. § 322 (2006). 
162 See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2). 
163 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7). 
164 For instance, a report issued by the Congressional Research Service assumes that 
the Privacy Act does not apply to data mining and suggests that Congress consider “the 
possible application of the Privacy Act to these [data-mining] initiatives.” See Seifert, supra 
note 33, at 19. 
165 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 423 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2005); Wil-
liams, 104 F.3d at 675; Henke v. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1459–62 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
166 See Williams, 104 F.3d at 675; Henke, 83 F.3d at 1459–62. 
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sonal details on millions of citizens might fall entirely outside Con-
gress’s data privacy scheme.167 And again, following the logic of Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, the President would have a re-
spectable argument that the database comes within his inherent consti-
tutional authority to protect national security.168 
IV. Europe: Legal Impossibility 
 In Europe, a secret government data-mining program like the 
NSA’s would be clearly illegal. Why? To summarize the rather compli-
cated analysis that follows, such a data-mining program would violate 
two different types of privacy guarantees—procedural and substantive. 
Procedurally, government data mining, even for national security ends, 
would have to be authorized by a public law or regulation that specified 
the purposes of the personal data processing and the limits on that data 
processing, to minimize the government’s interference with private 
life.169 Before the program could be enacted, an independent govern-
ment body would have to be consulted and, while the program was in 
operation, that same government body would need to have oversight 
and enforcement powers.170 These procedural requirements improve 
the prospect that the privacy ramifications of new government initia-
tives will be fully debated and widely understood at the outset. During 
the life of the government program, these procedures improve the 
chances that privacy violations will be detected and remedied. 
 Substantively, the reach of a European data-mining program would 
be narrower than that of the NSA call database. Although a spy agency 
might be allowed access to all call information held by national tele-
communications providers, it would not be allowed to retain the per-
sonal data as long as the NSA has—over five years now.171 Furthermore, 
the type of analysis performed on the data, as well as the uses of the 
                                                                                                                      
167 In practice, given the far-reaching exemptions that apply even if the personal data 
is considered part of a system of personal records, this simply means that the NSA is not 
obliged to publish a notice in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (2000) (detailing 
numerous exemptions). 
168 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
169 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 
2006, 1 BVerfGE 518/02 (para. 132) (F.R.G.) (providing an example of how government 
data mining was analyzed under the program’s authorizing statute). 
170 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 11, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 
2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 
2006; Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 
904, § 24 (F.R.G.). 
171 Data Retention Directive, supra note 14, arts. 3, 6. 
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results of the analysis, would have to be carefully circumscribed. The 
government would be permitted to use only search terms, statistical 
models, mathematical algorithms, and other analytical processes de-
signed to uncover serious threats.172 Under German law, for instance, 
an international terrorist attack is considered serious, while counterfeit-
ing abroad is not.173 And, under German law, before the government 
may engage in data mining there must be an “imminent and specific 
endangerment” (konkrete Gefahr) of a serious offense, not simply an “ab-
stract endangerment” of international terrorism, such as that existing 
in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.174 A spy agency 
in Germany would be allowed to pass on to law enforcement the names 
of individuals obtained through such data-mining techniques only if 
those individuals were suspected of planning to commit, or having al-
ready committed, a serious offense, and only if sufficient reasons ex-
isted for entertaining that suspicion.175 
 Another substantive difference would be the right, under Euro-
pean law, of individuals to check on their information. This right of 
access enables individuals to ensure that their information is factually 
correct and is being handled in accordance with the guarantees of pri-
vacy law.176 Finally, to switch the focus briefly from the government to 
the private sector, the same amount of call data in the hands of tele-
communications providers would not have been available to a Euro-
pean government. Under European law, telecommunications compa-
nies are prohibited from retaining personal data in the same quantities 
and for the same length of time as is routine—and legal—in the 
American business world.177 
A. The Liberal Justifications for Information Privacy 
 Although, as will be discussed below, some of the substantive guar-
antees of European law are quite technical, at the roots of these sub-
stantive guarantees are values easily recognizable to the members of any 
                                                                                                                      
172 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE, para. 158; Bundes-
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173 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 14, 
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2007] A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining 637 
liberal democracy. The most fundamental is what the legal philosopher 
Stanley Benn calls “respect for persons.”178 At the core of liberalism is 
the free, rational, equal person.179 The social contract rests upon this 
vision of individual autonomy—at one and the same time a product 
and promoter of this choosing being.180 From the observer’s perspec-
tive, acknowledging the privacy of another is respect for the choice 
made by that person to keep something for herself or her close circle of 
confidants.181 From the perspective of the observed, the right to keep 
certain matters private and make others public is critical to developing 
one’s identity as an autonomous person who freely chooses one’s own 
life projects.182 When the observer is the state, the failure to respect the 
choice for privacy has special consequences for liberty because of the 
substantial means at the disposal of the state. The total surveillance of 
George Orwell’s 1984 could only be achieved by the state.183 Collecting, 
combining, and manipulating information about people is the digital 
equivalent of gazing at them without their consent. This liberty interest 
underpins the law of information privacy. 
 A second reason for shielding individuals from the gaze of oth-
ers—and from the unfettered collection, storage, analysis, and retrieval 
of data about them—is to prevent all the possible illegitimate uses of 
this knowledge. In the United States, suppression of speech and politi-
cal protest is one of the most repugnant of these illegitimate uses. The 
attempt to draft Norwegian men into the German army using informa-
tion collected originally as innocent census data is another example.184 
Discrimination based on religion, race, or ethnic origin is yet another 
harmful use of knowledge of others. Again, although individuals and 
the government can commit these wrongs, the dangers are greater 
when the government is involved because of the tremendous resources 
at its command. Antiterrorism data mining, which makes heavy use of 
terrorist profiles based on sex (male), age (eighteen–forty years), relig-
ion (Muslim), and country of origin (country with significant Muslim 
population), quite obviously triggers these discrimination and speech 
concerns.185 
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 The other reasons for information privacy are somewhat more re-
mote from what is traditionally considered the core of privacy. One of 
these reasons is the theft of personal data for fraudulent or other 
criminal purposes, which is more likely with electronic data than paper 
records because of the ease with which such data can be collected and 
copied. In the case of antiterrorism data mining, however, the foremost 
of these reasons is the danger of inaccuracy. Because of the ease with 
which electronic data can be gathered, stored, and combined in the 
age of information technology, the accuracy of that data is difficult to 
guarantee. This is not simply because it is often recorded incorrectly 
through human error. When different data sets are combined, their 
different coding and software systems can lead the information in one 
of the data sets to be wrongly interpreted, based on the other data set’s 
coding and software system. What is more, electronic data is so easy to 
store that it can remain long after it has become inaccurate because the 
facts on the ground have changed. A valid data-mining process, as de-
scribed earlier, is dedicated in large part to fixing these inaccuracies. 
The questionable quality of electronic data is cause for concern be-
cause of the great reliance placed on such data by all types of actors in 
making a vast number of decisions with adverse consequences for the 
individuals concerned. When data is being mined to detect terrorists, 
these consequences are especially grievous: being wrongly surveilled, 
detained, prosecuted, or even convicted. 
B. Information Privacy as a European Fundamental Right 
 Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by 
“Europe.” Personal data processing for purposes of national security 
and law enforcement is covered by two Europe-wide instruments—the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) and the Coun-
cil of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing.186 It is also cov-
ered by individual national laws. This Article focuses on the laws of 
Germany and France because of their longstanding influence at the 
European level and, through instruments at the European level, on 
other national legal systems. The law of another Europe-wide organiza-
tion—the European Union—has not historically played much of a role 
in this area because of the limitations on the organization’s powers. 
The European Union, until recently, has been responsible for creating 
a common market, not for policing or protecting national security. 
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That constitutional structure is gradually changing, in the face of the 
expanding powers of the European Union, but the basic point is still 
valid. This discussion, therefore, only raises EU law selectively, for the 
few issues on which it is germane. 
 In European law, the main line of defense against data mining is 
general data protection law, not sectoral legislation as in the United 
States.187 The call records in this hypothetical are considered a subset of 
personal data—albeit a more protected subset of personal data than, 
say, one’s home address. For the very same set of facts, the source of 
government duties and individual rights is the law of telecommunica-
tions surveillance in the United States, while it is the general law of data 
privacy in Europe. 
 Of course, there is telecommunications law in Europe. At the con-
stitutional level, however, only in Germany is the privacy of communica-
tions and data related to communications afforded protection under a 
separate article of the Constitution and a separate line of cases.188 And 
even there, the constitutional reasoning is, for all intents and purposes, 
identical to the reasoning in the data privacy cases. At the statutory 
level, the law regulating telecommunications surveillance—which in 
Europe squarely includes the collection of noncontent data—always 
requires an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing before the com-
munications data may be intercepted by, or transferred to, the govern-
ment.189 The one exception to this requirement is German legislation 
                                                                                                                      
187 See id. 
188 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.). Article 10 says: “The confiden-
tiality of letters, as well as the confidentiality of post and telecommunications is inviolable.” 
Sabine Michalowski & Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law: The Protection 
of Civil Liberties 293 (1999). In 1999, the Constitutional Court explained that Article 10 
includes both the content of communications and noncontent data (called “connection 
data”): 
The protection of fundamental rights, however, is not restricted to shielding 
the content of an act of communication against the state taking note of it. 
The protection of fundamental rights also covers the circumstances of com-
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in all respects. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 51–52 (citations omitted). 
189 In France, electronic surveillance, including the monitoring and collection of non-
content data (données techniques), is regulated differently depending on whether it is con-
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on foreign intelligence surveillance, which contemplates not only indi-
vidualized surveillance but also “strategic surveillance.”190 Strategic sur-
veillance is similar to data mining in that large numbers of telephone 
calls and other forms of communications are intercepted, without a 
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, and then screened using cer-
tain search terms.191 Strategic surveillance is only permitted, however, 
for communications with foreign nations and only to prevent interna-
tional terrorist attacks and other types of national security threats.192 
Purely domestic phone calls are excluded.193 In sum, the general provi-
                                                                                                                      
ducted as part of a criminal investigation or for intelligence purposes. In the law enforce-
ment context, such surveillance is known as “judicial surveillance” (écoutes judiciares) be-
cause the authorizing order is issued by a member of the judicial branch. See Code pénal 
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Criminal Procedure. Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 
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regulated by a separate federal law, the G10 Law. Foreign security surveillance, mostly the 
responsibility of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or “BND”), is 
covered by the same federal law. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Germany’s Federal Constitutional 
Court and the Regulation of GPS Surveillance, 6 German L.J. 1805, 1812 (2005) (explaining 
organization and statutory regulation of German intelligence and law enforcement agen-
cies). In the wake of September 11, the BfV and the BND obtained broader access to cus-
tomer data held by telecommunications providers and financial institutions. Gesetz zur 
Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus [Terrorismusbekämpfungegesetz] [Law for 
the Fight of International Terrorism (Counterterrorism Law)], Jan. 11, 2002, BGBl I. at 
361 (F.R.G.). Still, however, requests for communications and financial data must be par-
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throwing the constitutional order; the BND must suspect an individual of being an actual 
(tatsächlich) danger to the foreign and security policy interests of Germany. Id. arts. 1, 10. 
190 This is the G10 Law of 1968, so-called because the law amended Article 10 of the 
Basic Law and gave effect to the second paragraph of that Article. See Blanca R. Ruiz, 
Privacy in Telecommunications: A European and an American Approach 218, 267 
(1997); Paul M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation 
of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 Hastings L.J. 751, 778–82 (2003). 
191 See Ruiz, supra note 190, at 219–20. 
192 See Schwartz, supra note 190, at 779. 
193 See id. at 779–80. 
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sions of telecommunications law could not be used to authorize the 
massive transfer of customer data to the government for data-mining 
purposes. Rather, in Europe, a government initiative like the NSA’s 
would require a new law or regulation and that law or regulation would 
have to satisfy both fundamental rights standards on data privacy as well 
as the requirements of general data protection legislation. 
 The privacy of personal information is considered a fundamental 
right at both the European and national levels. It is protected by the 
right to respect for private and family life in the ECHR,194 the right to 
informational self-determination195 and the privacy of communica-
tions196 in Germany, and the right to respect for private life in 
France.197 All information that is about a specific person is considered 
personal and therefore deserving of privacy. If the government wishes 
to interfere with this right, it must do so based on a law that is accessi-
ble to the public and that contains provisions precise enough to curb 
arbitrary government action and to put citizens on notice of possible 
incursions into their private sphere.198 The purpose of the interference 
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195 This constitutional right is based on the right to human dignity (Article 1) and the 
right to free development of one’s personality (Article 2.1). GG [Constitution] arts. 1, 2.1 
(F.R.G.); see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 323, 324–25 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the Census Act Case). 
196 GG [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.). 
197 See CC decision no. 94-352, Jan. 18, 1995 (Loi d’orientation et de programmation relative 
à la sécurité); CC decision no. 2004-499DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 2 (Loi relative à la protection 
des personnes physiques à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel). The respect for 
private life is recognized by the Constitutional Council as one of the liberties protected 
under Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens of 1789, which is con-
sidered part of the French Constitution of 1958 by virtue of the reference to the Declara-
tion in the preamble to the Constitution. CC decision no. 2004-499DC, Rec. 2. 
198 This is the interpretation given by the European Court of Human Rights to the re-
quirement, under Article 8, that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of his right [to private life] except such as is in accordance with the law.” 
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with privacy must be legitimate. Protecting “national security,” guaran-
teeing “public safety,” and preventing “disorder or crime” are specifi-
cally listed as legitimate purposes under Article 8 of the ECHR.199 The 
European Court of Human Rights has consistently ruled in favor of 
government legislation with such aims.200 Likewise, the German and 
French constitutional courts have repeatedly found preventing crime, 
fighting terrorism, and protecting national security to be legitimate 
public reasons for impinging upon individual rights.201 
 Fundamental rights law requires that the government’s legitimate 
interference with privacy be proportional. The proportionality test per-
vades the case law of all the European courts under consideration on 
all rights, not simply the right to privacy.202 Proportionality generally 
turns on three related inquiries:203 (1) Can the government action 
achieve the stated purpose? (2) Is the government action necessary for 
accomplishing the stated purpose, or are there alternative means of 
accomplishing the same purpose that will burden the right less? and 
(3) When a noneconomic right is at stake, even though there might be 
no alternative means for accomplishing the same purpose, is the bur-
den on the right nonetheless intolerable, requiring the law to be with-
drawn? Of course, this formulation greatly simplifies the doctrine of 
proportionality. The test differs not only among courts, but as between 
different cases decided by the same court.204 Moreover, the burden of 
                                                                                                                      
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 194, art. 8; see Peck v. United King-
dom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 para. 76 (2003). Under German constitutional law, laws that au-
thorize government interference with certain basic rights must be parliamentary laws. In 
other words, they must be laws directly voted on by the representatives of the people; they 
cannot be regulations promulgated by the executive branch, based on authority delegated 
by the parliament. This is the case for government restrictions on the right to the confi-
dentiality of telecommunication and the right to informational self-determination. See 
Ruiz, supra note 190, at 194–96. 
199 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 194, art. 8. 
200 See, e.g., Khan v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (2001); Klass & Others v. Ger-
many, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 para. 60 (1979). 
201 See Schwartz, supra note 190, at 771–82 (discussing the case law of the German Con-
stitutional Court); CC decision no. 2005-532DC, Jan. 19, 2006, Rec. paras. 14–22 (uphold-
ing a statute that permitted monitoring of certain vehicles by law enforcement officials in 
order to prevent and punish terrorism). 
202 See Gilles Dutertre, Key Case-Law Extracts: European Court of Human 
Rights 240, 241, 307, 311, 347, 368 (2003) (discussing the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, supra note 194, arts. 7–11, 14); Kommers, supra note 195, at 46 (Germany); 
CC decision no. 94-352DC, Jan. 18, 1995, Rec. 3 (France). 
203 See Kommers, supra note 195, at 46. 
204 For instance, the majority and the dissent employed different versions of the pro-
portionality test in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. Compare App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 
119–21 (2005) (holding that the state ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves in school 
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justification on the government varies tremendously depending on the 
right at stake and the public interest being pursued: the more impor-
tant the right, the higher the burden on the government; the more 
important the public purpose, the lower the burden on the govern-
ment.205 Nevertheless, it is useful to establish a least-common-denom-
inator point of reference. 
C. Statuory Requirements: The Council of Europe Convention  
and National Data Protection Laws 
 When the privacy right is data privacy and when the government 
interference is for purposes of law enforcement or national security, 
more specific conditions must also be met: the terms of the Council of 
Europe Convention and national data protection laws.206 Whereas the 
former sets down general data protection commitments, the latter give 
effect to, and elaborate extensively upon, those commitments. In 1981, 
the members of the Council of Europe concluded the Convention on 
Personal Data Processing (the “Convention”).207 The Convention is 
critical to understanding European data protection. Of all the Europe-
wide instruments on data protection, it has the broadest coverage, both 
regarding subject matter and geography.208 The Convention, unlike EU 
data protection laws, applies to all types of personal data processing, by 
both government and private actors.209 It has been ratified by thirty-
eight of the forty-six members of the Council of Europe and it has been 
signed, but not yet ratified, by six more member states.210 That is a con-
siderably broader group of nations than the membership of the Euro-
pean Union. Furthermore, because of the Convention’s age, it has 
been influential in developing data protection legislation everywhere in 
Europe. National latecomers to the policy area like the United King-
                                                                                                                      
was proportional to the state’s legitimate interests), with id. paras. 1–13 (Tuklens, J., dis-
senting) (contending that the ban on wearing headscarves was not “necessary in a democ-
ratic society” in part because the ban was not proportionate to the state’s legitimate inter-
ests). 
205 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 67. 
206 See generally Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18; Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 
1978, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 
of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 2006; Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal 
Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904 (F.R.G.). 
207 See Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy and Pol-
icy Instruments in Global Perspective 84–87 (2d ed. 2006). 
208 See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18. 
209 See id. arts. 2(a), 3.1. 
210 See Bennett & Raab, supra note 207, at 85. 
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dom copied the terms of the Convention into their domestic data pro-
tection legislation at the time of implementation.211 The European Un-
ion has used the Convention’s general principles as the framework for 
the more detailed provisions of its data protection law governing mar-
ket actors.212 Other EU data protection rules are copied directly from 
the Convention.213 
 The data protection laws of Germany and France also have par-
ticular significance. National data protection legislation is generally 
categorized according to historical vintage: the first generation, en-
acted in the 1970s; the second generation, dating to the 1980s and 
adopted to implement the Convention; and the third generation, 
adopted in the late 1990s and early 2000s to fulfill the requirements of 
membership in the European Union.214 The German and French laws 
belong, squarely, to the first generation.215 Because of their early vin-
tage, they were influential blueprints for the Convention. And, as a re-
sult of Germany’s and France’s extensive regulatory experience, their 
legal instruments—and their data protection officials—continue to ex-
ercise influence, both on novel questions of data protection and on 
countries in the process of adopting their first data protection legisla-
tion. 
 In Germany, the Federal Data Protection Act was originally en-
acted in 1977, and significantly amended in 1990 and 2001. It covers 
private actors throughout Germany,216 including telecommunications 
companies and federal public bodies, such as Germany’s federal law 
                                                                                                                      
211 See, e.g., Data Protection Act, 1984, c. 29 (Eng.). For a history of the U.K. legisla-
tion, see Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy 
in Europe and the United States 89–94 (1992). 
212 See generally Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
31. 
213 Schengen Acquis, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 
1985 Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at 
Their Common Borders, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19, art. 115 [hereinafter Schengen Acquis]; 
Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Establishment 
of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 1995 O.J. (C 316) 2, art. 14 [hereinaf-
ter Article K.3 Convention]. 
214 See Bennett & Raab, supra note 207, at 126–27. 
215 See generally, e.g., Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], 
Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of 
Jan. 23, 2006; Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, 
BGBl. I at 904 (F.R.G.) (enacted in 1977). 
216 Federal Data Protection Act § 27. 
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enforcement and intelligence agencies.217 An independent agency, 
known as the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, has been estab-
lished to enforce federal data protection law.218 In addition, a special 
oversight system has been established for telecommunications surveil-
lance—including surveillance of noncontent data—conducted by do-
mestic and foreign intelligence agencies; an independent commission 
(the “G10 Commission”), appointed by the parliamentary committee 
responsible for oversight of Germany’s intelligence services, reviews 
individual surveillance orders as well as the administrative rules govern-
ing strategic surveillance.219 Each Land also has its own Data Protection 
Act.220 These acts set down the data protection rules that discipline 
state government. They create Land data protection authorities to en-
force both the Land rules and the Federal Data Protection Act’s provi-
sions on market actors.221 Land data protection rules are also pertinent 
to intelligence gathering for purposes of preventing terrorism. The 
Länder all have their own police forces, governed by Land data protec-
tion laws, and responsible not only for criminal investigations but also 
for protecting public order against future offenses such as terrorist acts 
(“preventive policing”).222 
 In contrast with federal Germany, France is a unitary system. This 
greatly simplifies the legislative scheme—it has only one data protec-
tion law and one data protection law enforcer. The Law on Data Proc-
essing, Data Files and Individual Liberties (“Law No. 78-17”) was en-
acted in 1978 and significantly amended in 2004.223 It regulates data 
processing throughout the economy and throughout government, in-
                                                                                                                      
217 Id. § 12. 
218 Bennett, supra note 211, at 77–90; David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in 
Surveillance Societies 22–24 (1989). 
219 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 92–93; Ruiz, 
supra note 190, at 218–20, 272–74. 
220 See Flaherty, supra note 218, at 21. 
221 In Germany’s federal system, state government is entrusted with implementing and 
enforcing most federal legislation. See David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany 69–76 (1994). 
222 See Ross, supra note 80, at 7, 25, 28. However, the surveillance activities of the Land 
agencies charged with national security (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz) are governed 
exclusively by federal law, namely the G10 Law. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], 
July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE at 9; see also Gesetz zur Beschraenkung des Brief-, Post- und 
Fernmeldegeheimnisses—Gesetz zu Artikel 10 des Grundgesetzes [GG10] [Law Restrict-
ing the Secrecy of Correspondence of Letters, Mail and Telecommunications—Law Apply-
ing to Article 10 of the Constitution], Aug. 13, 1968 BGBl. I at 949, § 1.1. 
223 See Flaherty, supra note 218, at 165. See generally Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, J.O. 
[Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 
2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 2006. 
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cluding the police and national security agencies.224 An independent 
agency, the Commission Nationale de l’Information et des Libertés 
(“CNIL”), is entrusted with extensive enforcement powers.225 It is 
charged with registering and authorizing certain types of data process-
ing operations, with promulgating interpretive regulations, with con-
ducting inspections and imposing administrative sanctions, and with 
advising the government on legislative and regulatory measures affect-
ing privacy.226 
 Fundamental rights law is the basic framework for the Council of 
Europe Convention and the German and French legislation. The Con-
vention and the legislation contain a specific set of conditions designed 
to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy and proportionality in those 
instances in which the right to data privacy is burdened.227 Paralleling 
the fundamental rights doctrine on the need for an authorizing law, 
personal data should be processed fairly and lawfully.228 Because a fun-
damental right is at stake any time an individual’s personal data is 
processed, such data must be stored for specified and legitimate pur-
poses and should only be used in accordance with those purposes.229 
The amount of the data processed should be no more than necessary to 
accomplish the purpose.230 Neither should the time during which the 
data is stored be any longer than necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose.231 The data must be accurate and, whenever necessary, kept up to 
date—otherwise, how would such data processing be able to achieve 
the stated purpose?232 Types of personal data that are believed to be 
especially sensitive—for instance, data revealing racial origin, religious 
beliefs, and health conditions—must be afforded “appropriate safe-
guards.”233 Those who process personal data must put into place “ap-
propriate security measures” to ensure that personal information will 
                                                                                                                      
224 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 2. 
225 Id. art. 5. 
226 Id. art. 11. 
227 See Rotaru, App. No. 28341/95, para. 43 (relying on the Council of Europe Conven-
tion in interpreting European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8). 
228 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 5a. Even more precise is the 
German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 
904, § 4(1). It says: “The collection, processing and use of personal data shall be admissible 
only if permitted or prescribed by this Act or any other legal provision or if the data sub-
ject has consented.” Id. 
229 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 5b. 
230 Id. art. 5c. 
231 Id. art. 5e. 
232 Id. art. 5d. 
233 Id. art. 6. 
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be revealed only to those for whom it is intended.234 As a special safe-
guard for the burdened privacy right, individuals should have the right 
to check their personal data to make sure that it is accurate and that, in 
all other respects, their personal data is being processed in accordance 
with the law.235 All these guarantees can be found in the German and 
French data protection laws, albeit in more detailed incarnations.236 
 The state parties are allowed to derogate from the Convention’s 
provisions in the interests of “protecting State security, public safety, the 
monetary interests of the State or the suppression of criminal of-
fences.”237 These are interests clearly at stake in our hypothetical. Such 
derogations, however, must be detailed in the state party’s national law 
and must be necessary, meaning that they must be carefully justified 
like any other government interference with the right to privacy.238 
Both the German and the French legislation take advantage of this pos-
sibility; exceptions exist for data processing for intelligence and law en-
forcement purposes.239 In neither case, however, is such data process-
ing, by the relevant government agencies, entirely or even mostly ex-
empt from the safeguards of national data protection law. 
 Another distinguishing feature of European data privacy law is the 
enforcement system. Independent agencies responsible for the en-
forcement of data protection law have been established in all European 
countries.240 To these national agencies, add the supranational bodies 
responsible for overseeing compliance in the European Union: the 
European Data Protection Supervisor with jurisdiction over EU institu-
tions responsible for common market regulation,241 the Joint Supervi-
sory Body with jurisdiction over personal data exchanged through Eu-
ropol,242 and the Joint Supervisory Authority with jurisdiction over per-
                                                                                                                      
234 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 7. 
235 Id. art. 8. 
236 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, arts. 38–43, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 
7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 
23, 2006 (rights of individuals in respect of processing of personal data); Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, §§ 19–21, 33–35 
(F.R.G.) (rights of the data subject). 
237 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 9.2a. 
238 See id. 
239 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 41; Federal Data Protection Act § 19(3)–(4). 
240 See Bennett & Raab, supra note 207, at 133, 136–37. 
241 See generally Council Regulation 45/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions 
and bodies and on the free movement of such data). 
242 See Article K.3 Convention, supra note 213, art. 24. Europol is located in The 
Hague, Netherlands. It was established by the Member States to support their police forces 
and other national law enforcement authorities, such as customs agencies, immigration 
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sonal data exchanged through Schengen.243 The powers of these na-
tional and supranational privacy agencies vary, but most, including the 
German and French data protection authorities, have the power to re-
view proposed laws and regulations with a data protection impact, to 
conduct inspections of private and public data processors, and to 
commence administrative proceedings against violators which may re-
sult in injunctive orders or administrative fines.244 Because many viola-
tions of national laws are considered criminal offenses, such agencies 
also have the power to bring prosecutions directly or to refer privacy 
violations to public prosecutors for further action.245 
                                                                                                                      
services, and border and financial police. Europol’s remit covers serious organized crime 
with an international dimension, including terrorism. It is to assist national authorities in 
combating international organized crime by collecting, analyzing, and transmitting intelli-
gence to those authorities. Its information comes from national law enforcement bodies, 
as well as international agencies. Europol, however, does not have any enforcement or 
police powers; Europol information is used for national police investigations. For back-
ground information on Europol, see generally Eric Davies, European Police Office 
(2000); Steven Peers, Human Rights Ctr., Europol: The Final Step in the Creation 
of an “Investigative and Operational” European Police Force (2007), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/europol-analysis.pdf. 
243 Schengen Acquis, supra note 213, art. 115. Schengen was originally created by a 
small group of Member States to manage jointly the admission of foreign citizens to their 
territories. See Madelein Colvin, The Schengen Information System: A Human Rights 
Audit 7 (2000). The key elements of the scheme are a common visa—recognized by all 
state parties—and the removal of internal border controls among the state parties. Id. 
Currently, the signatories are the EU Member States, with the exception of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, and three European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) countries— Ice-
land, Norway, and Switzerland. Id. Fifteen of the twenty-six signatories have implemented 
the Schengen agreement. To enable national authorities to monitor foreign citizens admit-
ted on the common visa, a secure database known as the Schengen Information System 
(the “SIS”) has been established. Id. at 16. Unlike the Europol system, the information 
contained in the SIS is not collected and analyzed centrally. Id. at 16–17. Rather, national 
police and law enforcement authorities independently enter and extract information from 
the system. Id. The data contained in the SIS is extremely varied: loss or theft of passports 
and other identity documents, names of individuals suspected of having committed serious 
crimes, extradition warrants, car thefts, and more. Id. at 17. As should be clear from this 
list of data, the SIS is no longer used solely for enforcing immigration policy. See id. It has 
become a general purpose database for fighting crime with a cross-border element. See id. 
at 22–23. 
244 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 11–12, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 
7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 
23, 2006 (establishing composition and powers of CNIL); id. arts. 45–49 (setting down 
administrative sanctions); id. arts. 50–52 (setting down criminal sanctions); Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, §§ 22–26 (F.R.G.) 
(setting down composition and powers of Federal Commission for Data Protection); id. 
§ 38 (setting down requirements for Land data protection authorities); id. §§ 43–44 (set-
ting down administrative and penal sanctions for breaches of Federal Data Protection Act). 
245 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, arts. 50–52; Federal Data Protection Act § 44. 
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 A final important aspect of European privacy law is the application 
of the law to public and private actors alike. At the level of fundamental 
rights, the guarantees of the ECHR and the German Basic Law have 
been applied to privacy violations committed by private actors, not only 
by the government.246 At what might be termed in the European hier-
archy of legal norms, the statutory level, data protection guarantees are 
binding on both public and private users of personal data. Thus, in the 
Council of Europe Convention, no distinction is made between the du-
ties of private and public actors.247 Given the greater specificity of legis-
lation at the national level, the French and German laws do separate 
public from private data processing, but only for purposes of stipulating 
special duties that apply to certain types of data processing, such as that 
involving national identification numbers.248 
D. Application of European Law to the NSA Call Records Scenario 
 Now to apply European law to the facts of our hypothetical. As dis-
cussed above, fundamental rights law requires first that the law be ac-
cessible to the public, containing precise provisions to limit govern-
mental discretion and provide notice to citizens.249 Second, the inter-
ference with privacy must be legitimate.250 Finally, the interference 
must be proportional.251 After satisfying these fundamental rights stan-
dards, the specific requirements of the Council of Europe Convention 
and national data protection laws must still be met.252 
                                                                                                                      
246 See generally Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte [Berlin Center District Court], Geschäftsnum-
ber [Docket No.] 16 C 427/02, Dec. 18, 2003 (F.R.G.) (holding for plaintiff in suit by pedes-
trian against Berlin department store for removal of surveillance cameras based on Basic 
Law, Articles 1 and 2 and Federal Data Protection Act); Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 
59320/00, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2004) (applying Article 8 in case of privacy violation by the 
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247 Council of Europe Convention, supra note 18, art. 3. 
248 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, arts. 25–29; Federal Data Protection Act §§ 12–21 
(governing data processing by public bodies); id. §§ 27–38a (governing data processing by 
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249 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 206–248 and accompanying text. 
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1. Application of European Principles of Fundamental Rights 
 Would a secret presidential directive count as a “law” for purposes 
of the fundamental rights analysis? No. By definition, a secret directive 
is not accessible to the public. It cannot put citizens on notice of how 
their government is interfering with their basic rights. Nor can it curb 
potential abuses of government power, because no one but those gov-
ernment officials know the limits placed on their power by the direc-
tive. 
 European law, of course, permits exceptions to data privacy rules 
based on national security concerns, though surely not on the scale sug-
gested by the U.S. President, who has claimed that any disclosure of the 
NSA call database threatens national security.253 One useful indicator of 
how such a claim would be addressed in Europe is a German constitu-
tional case involving the G10 Law.254 That law, enacted in 1968, pro-
vides for wide-ranging surveillance by Germany’s domestic and foreign 
security agencies to “ward off dangers which threaten the free democ-
ratic order, the existence or the safety of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many or of one of the German Länder.”255 Two types of surveillance are 
contemplated by this law: individual monitoring and strategic surveil-
lance.256 Strategic surveillance closely resembles the NSA’s data mining: 
the Federal Intelligence Service screens phone traffic between Ger-
many and certain foreign nations based on search terms related to the 
national security threats set down by statute.257 
 When the G10 Law was amended in 1994 to expand the list of 
threats warranting surveillance, a constitutional challenge was brought 
against the provisions on strategic surveillance.258 Part of the challenge 
involved the program’s lack of transparency.259 The basic conditions for 
conducting strategic surveillance were set down in the statutory 
amendments and responsibility for developing specific search terms 
                                                                                                                      
253 See also Terkel v. AT&T, 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (discussing the 
government’s assertion that the database is protected by the “state secrets” privilege, which 
bars discovery of information that would adversely affect national security); ACLU v. NSA, 
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gence Activities, Including Covert Actions 9 (2006). 
254 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], July 14, 1999, 1 BVerfGE. 
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was delegated to the administration.260 Those search terms were subject 
to review and possible cancellation by the independent body dedicated 
to overseeing intelligence gathering involving telecommunications (the 
“G10 Commission”). Such review, however, did not satisfy the Court. 
The Court held that the G10 Commission also had to have the power to 
review the other aspects of the Federal Intelligence Service’s personal 
data processing: the transfer of personal data to law enforcement and 
domestic intelligence agencies, the destruction of personal data, and 
the steps taken to notify individuals that they had been the target of 
surveillance.261 The challenge also involved the provisions setting down 
the government’s duty to notify individuals singled out as a result of 
strategic surveillance.262 The Court struck down an exemption from the 
duty of notification for data destroyed within three months of the date 
of acquisition on the grounds that this exemption impermissibly cir-
cumscribed the individual’s right to know.263 Given this reasoning, it is 
highly unlikely that the German Constitutional Court would approve of 
keeping an entire surveillance program secret. Any slight advantage 
that the government might gain from keeping secret a database involv-
ing the personal data of millions of citizens not individually suspected 
of terrorism would almost certainly be outweighed by the harm to the 
fundamental right to privacy. 
 The good news for the call database is that it would satisfy the sec-
ond requirement of European fundamental rights law: collecting call 
data and mining it to protect against terrorist attacks is, most certainly, 
a legitimate purpose. But what about proportionality? Can a database 
with the calling records of tens of millions of citizens be necessary to 
fight terrorism? European courts and privacy officers show consider-
able deference to their intelligence services in making this kind of de-
termination.264 They are acutely aware of their limits in understanding 
how to combat terrorism, as compared to the seasoned professionals in 
their national spy agencies. But, in Europe, to satisfy the first prong of 
the proportionality test, an argument would have to be made that data 
collection was capable of reducing the terrorist threat. 
 One good illustration of the case that would be expected from a 
European government is the debate leading up to the EU Data Reten-
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tion Directive of March 2006 (the “Directive”).265 Under the Directive, 
providers of electronic communications services and networks are re-
quired to keep traffic data related to phone calls, emails, and other 
communications for a period of six months to two years, depending on 
the Member State.266 Such data must be made available to the national 
police and, via the national police, to police officers in other Member 
States.267 The purpose of the Directive is to fight serious crime, most 
notably terrorism.268 Notwithstanding this purpose, the Directive ap-
plies to market actors and it was therefore adopted as a common mar-
ket measure. In proposing the Directive, the national governments in 
the Council of Ministers put forward a study based on the experience 
of the British police showing that call data older than six months was 
often useful in investigating serious crimes.269 This evidence was subse-
quently questioned by the independent data protection officers called 
upon to examine the proposed directive.270 Notwithstanding this skep-
ticism, a data retention requirement of six months to two years was ul-
timately passed.271 But what is significant for purposes of this discussion 
is that the Council of Ministers had to produce some evidence in sup-
port of the data processing. It could not simply order the collection of 
call data based on entirely unsubstantiated speculation that the scheme 
might accomplish the crime-fighting purposes. 
 Under the second prong of the proportionality test, the govern-
ment would need to show that the data-mining program was necessary 
for protecting national security.272 In practice, this means that the gov-
ernment would have to refute claims that alternative, less privacy-
burdensome programs could accomplish, just as effectively, the same 
antiterrorism aims. This issue is directly related to the amount of data 
collected and the length of data retention and therefore is discussed 
below, in conjunction with the Council of Europe Convention.273 
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 The last part of the proportionality analysis requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the benefit to the public security ends of the 
call database outweighs the harm to the privacy right—or, seen from 
the individual’s perspective, that the burden on the right is “propor-
tionate” to the government purpose being pursued.274 This question 
turns entirely on the magnitude of the harm to the individual right as 
compared to the benefit to the public interest. When data mining is 
conducted for national security purposes, the privacy interest is strong 
because of the risk that the individual might be wrongly investigated, 
detained, prosecuted, or even convicted. It is stronger than when, say, 
personal information is used to distribute welfare benefits. The impor-
tance of the public interest depends on which types of threats to na-
tional security and what level of suspicion serve as the trigger for data 
mining. In the case of the NSA call records program, we do not know; 
this extreme secrecy is part of the problem for European privacy law. 
But according to the German Constitutional Court, not all threats war-
rant intelligence-related searches of telecommunications data: interna-
tional terrorist attacks, international proliferation of weapons, and the 
illegal introduction of a not-insignificant quantity of narcotics from 
abroad, yes, but international counterfeiting, no.275 More to the point, 
the Constitutional Court has recently held that a general fear of terror-
ism in the wake of September 11 is not good enough to trigger antiter-
rorism data mining.276 
 On April 4, 2006, the Constitutional Court found that police data 
mining carried out after September 11 to identify Islamic sleeper cells 
was unconstitutional.277 In Germany, antiterrorism data mining was first 
used in the 1970s to fight the Red Army Faction, a left-wing terrorist 
group.278 The German version of antiterrorism data mining (Raster-
fahndung) appears to be less ambitious technologically than the Ameri-
can version.279 Terrorist profiles are first created, based on characteris-
tics generally believed to be associated with terrorism.280 Those profiles 
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are then used to search public and private databases.281 This results in a 
list of individuals who are then subject to examination by the police to 
establish whether they do indeed pose a threat to public safety.282 In the 
wake of September 11, the police forces of the Länder undertook a co-
ordinated effort to collect and search various data sets based on a 
common terrorist profile: male, age eighteen–forty, student or former 
student, Islamic faith, and citizenship or birthplace in a country with a 
predominantly Islamic population.283 The results of these searches were 
transmitted to the Federal Police Office, which matched the names 
against other data sets containing information on other characteristics 
associated with terrorism, and thereby narrowed the pool.284 The 
names of suspects were then sent back to the Länder police for further 
review and possible surveillance and questioning.285 These activities 
were authorized by specific provisions of Land police acts that allow the 
police to collect and analyze data for purposes of state security or for 
protecting the “life, health, or freedom of a person.”286 
 In a complaint brought against the state of North-Rhine West-
phalia, the German Constitutional Court found that the data-mining 
program was unconstitutional.287 The Court reaffirmed its earlier case 
law on the right of informational self-determination: the right protects 
against the police’s collection, transfer, storage, and processing of per-
sonal information.288 Moving to the proportionality inquiry, the Court 
found that the national security purpose of the program was legitimate 
and that the data mining was a suitable and necessary means of obtain-
ing that goal.289 But the Court concluded that the burden on the right 
of informational self-determination was not proportionate to the public 
ends being pursued.290 Such data mining, with such grave conse-
quences for constitutional rights, would only be acceptable if there 
were actual facts demonstrating an “imminent and specific endanger-
ment” (konkrete Gefahr) of a terrorist attack.291 In this instance, police 
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data mining had been triggered by a general fear of terrorism following 
September 11—for the Constitutional Court, this was not reason 
enough to intrude upon the privacy right.292 
2. Applying the Council of Europe Convention and the National Laws 
of Germany and France 
 At this point, the data protection inquiry turns to the more specific 
requirements of the Council of Europe Convention and national laws. 
Is the call data being used by the government only for purposes of iden-
tifying possible terrorists and thwarting future terrorist attacks? This is 
one more difficulty with the secretiveness of the NSA program: no as-
surances have been given that the call data is not being used for more 
banal purposes—for instance, for identifying ordinary bank robbers 
and turning over their names to law enforcement officials. 
 Is the amount of data being processed no more than necessary to 
accomplish the terrorism-fighting purpose? Curiously, at least for a 
European audience, when certain U.S. Senators learned of the call da-
tabase, they complained that it contained too little data—not too 
much.293 If the purpose is to foil terrorist plots on American soil, the 
Senators reasoned, shouldn’t the NSA have information on all the calls 
made and received by all Americans, not just clients of AT&T and Veri-
zon? But, in Europe, the amount of call data would probably be con-
sidered excessive. Again, the debates on the recent EU Data Retention 
Directive are instructive. Under the Directive, the police may obtain 
electronic communications data from providers only “in specific 
cases”294 and only for purposes of fighting “serious crime.”295 A pro-
gram giving the government routine, indiscriminate access to all traffic 
data of all customers would probably involve an excessive amount of 
data under European law.296 
 As for the time of data retention, that also would be too long. 
From the press accounts, it appears that the NSA began collecting call 
data immediately after September 11, 2001.297 There does not seem to 
be any requirement to erase the data. That means that some of the in-
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formation is over five years old. In the European Union, even the most 
hawkish of Member States—the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, and 
Sweden—only pushed for a three-year data retention period, after 
which call data would have had to be destroyed.298 Five years is far be-
yond anything ever imagined for the European Union. 
 The accuracy requirement, however, would probably be satisfied. 
Because the purpose of the NSA program is to track individual behav-
ior, not, say, award benefits, it is not critical that the personal data in the 
system be routinely checked and updated. Call data, moreover, does 
not generally reveal sensitive personal characteristics such as religious 
affiliation, and therefore it would not require additional safeguards 
under European law. It seems safe to assume that the “appropriate se-
curity measures” have been adopted. The NSA, probably the most 
technologically sophisticated of all U.S. government agencies, has most 
likely taken the necessary steps to protect the call data from unauthor-
ized disclosures. 
 That being said, individuals have absolutely no right to check on 
their personal data being used by the NSA. On this last step of the data 
protection analysis, European systems differ considerably. Some have 
made more extensive use of the national security exemption than oth-
ers. Neither Germany nor France, however, categorically bars individu-
als from exercising their right of access in cases of national security data 
processing.299 
 Under German law, access to one’s personal data and the correc-
tion, erasure, or blocking of such data count as the “inalienable rights 
of the data subject.”300 National security agencies may, on a case-by-case 
basis, deny access if disclosure would “impair public safety or order or 
otherwise be detrimental to the Federation or a Land.”301 Even these 
agencies, however, must give reasons for denying such a request, either 
to the individual directly or to the Federal Commissioner for Data Pro-
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tection, unless giving reasons would itself jeopardize “public safety or 
order or otherwise be detrimental to the Federation or a Land.”302 The 
federal police, by contrast, are never exempted from their duty to give 
access, although the information may be communicated to the Federal 
Data Protection Commissioner rather than to the individual.303 Land 
regulation of their police forces varies, but the Hessian legislation is 
illustrative.304 The Hessian police are not given a blanket exemption 
from disclosure.305 Rather, the Hessian Data Protection Act states that 
the statutory provisions on access 
shall not apply where after balancing the rights accorded to 
the data subject against public interest in data secrecy . . . the 
latter interests prevail. The decision shall be made by the 
head, or his designated deputy, of the data storage agency. If 
the data subject is denied information or the right to inspect 
records, he shall be informed of the major reasons on which 
the denial is based and of his right to complain to the Hessian 
Data Protection Commissioner.306 
 Under the French data protection law, the right of access is indi-
rect “where processing involves State security, defence or public 
safety,” meaning that an individual cannot approach the intelligence 
agency directly but must proceed via CNIL, the independent privacy 
commission.307 The procedure for so-called “indirect access” is as fol-
lows: 
 The [CNIL] receives the access request and appoints one of 
its members, who is or has been a member of the “Conseil 
d’Etat” [highest administrative court], the “Cour de Cass-
ation” [highest civil court] or the “Cour des Comptes” [inde-
pendent body responsible for auditing government accounts], 
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to carry out the necessary investigations and have the neces-
sary modifications made. An officer of the commission may 
assist the appointed member of the commission. The appli-
cant shall be informed that the verifications have been carried 
out. 
 Whenever the commission establishes, with the agreement 
of the data controller, that the disclosure of the data does not 
undermine its purposes, State security, the defence or public 
safety, these data may be disclosed to the applicant.308 
 By contrast, the default rule for personal data held by law en-
forcement agencies is direct access. The regulation authorizing the data 
processing, however, may provide for indirect access: 
 The [right of indirect access] shall apply to processing car-
ried out by public authorities and departments and private le-
gal entities entrusted with a public service mission for the 
prevention, investigation or proof of criminal offenses, or the 
assessment or collection of taxes, where the [authorizing 
regulation] provides for this right.309 
In sum, notwithstanding all of the exceptions for national security and 
law enforcement, the NSA call database would violate the European 
right of access, too. 
 The principal institution of European privacy law—an independent 
watchdog agency—is also missing in the United States.310 The NSA did 
not first consult an independent privacy agency before undertaking the 
call records program. In France or Germany, by contrast, a government 
proposal for data mining, even intelligence-related data mining, would 
have to be submitted to an independent privacy regulator for review.311 
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Such review would entail a wide-ranging proportionality analysis—along 
the lines of this Article—and would result in a finding on the lawfulness 
of the program, as well as recommendations for limiting the govern-
ment’s interference with the right to privacy.312 This institutional re-
quirement is not designed solely to improve the privacy quality of the 
program by ensuring that the necessary safeguards are in place to pre-
vent government abuses. Scrutiny by an independent regulator also im-
proves public awareness of government intrusions in highly technical 
policy areas in which the burden on privacy can be obscure to the aver-
age citizen. In sum, the involvement of a privacy agency, coupled with 
the requirement of a detailed, accessible authorizing law, gives rise to a 
vigorous public debate on the privacy costs of government initiatives 
that may—or may not—be necessary in a post-September 11 world. 
 A European privacy agency would also have the power to make 
sure that intelligence officers running a data-mining program were 
complying with basic privacy safeguards. In France, this takes the form 
of a standard administrative enforcement scheme. CNIL has the power 
to inspect government programs,313 and, if it finds violations, to impose 
sanctions.314 In data processing related to national security and law en-
forcement, these powers are quite soft, but they exist nonetheless.315 
Data processing related to “state security” can be insulated from CNIL’s 
inspection powers at the time that the program is authorized.316 If 
CNIL learns of privacy breaches in government programs involving 
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“state security” or “criminal offenses,” it has the power to issue warnings 
and order the termination of such breaches.317 If the order is ignored, 
CNIL may publicize the privacy breach.318 When the violation of privacy 
rights is “urgent,” CNIL has the power to “notify the Prime Minister so 
that he may, if necessary, take measures to stop the violation . . . . The 
Prime Minister shall inform the commission of the steps he has taken 
within fifteen days of receiving the notification.”319 And in the case of a 
“serious and immediate” violation, CNIL’s chairman may “ask, in sum-
mary proceedings, the competent jurisdiction to order, if necessary ap-
plying a daily penalty, any security measure necessary for the protection 
of these rights and liberties.”320 Finally, private actors and public offi-
cials may be criminally prosecuted under the French data protection 
law.321 
 In contrast with the French system of privacy enforcement, the 
German system relies more on consultation and persuasion than on 
hard sanctions. This is also the case when data processing is conducted 
for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Thus, in Germany, each 
public and private body—including intelligence agencies—must ap-
point an internal “data-protection official” responsible for overseeing 
compliance within the organization.322 Internal data protection officials 
must notify the responsible data protection agency of any violations.323 
The Federal Data Protection Commissioner is responsible for “moni-
tor[ing] compliance”324 and the Land authorities for “monitor[ing] 
implementation”325 within their respective jurisdictions. Thus, in the 
case of a suspected privacy violation by an agency like the Federal Intel-
ligence Service, the Federal Commissioner would have the power to 
inspect documents; to obtain answers to questions; to advise on steps 
for improving data protection; and, in the case of a breach, to file a 
complaint with the head of the agency and to require a response from 
that agency outlining its remedial measures.326 Should compliance not 
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be forthcoming, the Federal Commissioner is authorized to report the 
matter to Parliament.327 This is the standard operating procedure for 
monitoring all agencies. Data protection commissioners in the Länder, 
responsible for overseeing their government administrations, including 
their police forces and domestic security agencies, have similar powers 
of inspection and persuasion.328 
 Only two exceptions are made for intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies. First, inspections must be conducted by the Federal 
Commissioner in person or by assistants specially designated by him.329 
Second, when the agency is a federal intelligence agency and the per-
sonal data is telecommunications data, as in our hypothetical, primary 
responsibility for oversight rests with the parliamentary G10 Commis-
sion.330 The Federal Commissioner may be requested by the G10 
Commission to investigate and report on such data processing, but he 
does not have independent powers.331 The same is the case when the 
agency is a Land intelligence agency and the personal data is telecom-
munications data—oversight is the task of the Land parliament, not the 
Land data protection commissioner.332 
 The last aspect of the NSA episode that is puzzling to the Euro-
pean observer is the availability of so much personal data in the hands 
of private firms, ready to be transferred to the government whenever it 
so requests. As explained earlier, European data protection law covers 
both the public and private sectors.333 To collect personal data, private 
actors must have a legitimate purpose and must use such data only in 
accordance with that legitimate purpose.334 For commercial operators, 
the legitimate purpose is generally providing a good or service to cus-
tomers and collecting the payment due for the good or service. Only 
personal information relevant to this contractual relationship can be 
gathered.335 And once the contract has been fulfilled—the good or ser-
vice provided and the payment rendered—the personal data is to be 
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erased.336 It cannot be kept and used for other purposes. The most 
common American counterexample—aside from helping out the 
NSA—is using personal data collected for a contractual relationship to 
market unrelated goods and services. 
 Providers of electronic communications services are not only gov-
erned by these general principles of European law. For them, there is a 
specific EU law requiring that a subscriber’s communications data be 
erased once no longer necessary for connecting the communication or 
for obtaining payment on the bill.337 The law allows for some excep-
tions. For instance, if the subscriber gives her consent at the time of 
signing up for the service, the provider may use the subscriber’s per-
sonal information for purposes of marketing additional services.338 
Member States may require, by law, that their electronic communica-
tions providers retain subscriber data and make that data available for 
legitimate government purposes.339 Such data retention requirements 
have been enacted in most Member States to enable their police forces 
and intelligence agencies to obtain communications data necessary for 
investigations. As a matter of fact, the EU Data Retention Directive was 
designed to harmonize some of these very different data retention re-
quirements at the Member State level.340 In Europe, therefore, tele-
communications providers do keep personal data to assist with intelli-
gence and police operations, much as AT&T and Verizon kept the call 
records that were later transferred to the NSA. But, unlike their Ameri-
can counterparts, European telecommunications providers can keep 
personal data after performance on a subscriber contract only because 
specific laws instruct them to do so, setting down the type of data to be 
retained, the time when the data must be erased, and the conditions 
under which the data may be requested by government agencies. 
V. The Consequences of Comparison 
 These differences between European and American privacy law 
have several ramifications. Politically, the legal differences have strained 
relations between Europe and the United States and have frustrated 
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transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The compari-
son can also prompt law reform in the United States. It reveals that, 
notwithstanding the common transatlantic commitment to information 
privacy in the early 1970s, today the European system protects privacy 
more effectively than the American one. Those parts of the European 
statutory scheme that have contributed to this outcome should inform 
the U.S. Congress’s attempts to legislate more effective information 
privacy law. 
A. Obstacles to Transatlantic Cooperation on Fighting Terrorism 
 The practical consequences of these legal differences are dra-
matic. Transatlantic cooperation on national security has already been 
strained by differences in privacy law. The latest string of revelations 
related to the NSA’s activities can only make cooperation more diffi-
cult. The U.S. government might wish to obtain information held by 
European spy and law enforcement agencies for purposes of prevent-
ing terrorist attacks. Yet because the way it handles personal data is so 
out of line with European law, it is increasingly unlikely that it will be 
able to get that data. 
 The dilemma for any European government is simple: how can it 
transfer information on its citizens to the U.S. government when, in all 
likelihood, the information will end up in a database that would clearly 
be unlawful if created by that same European government—especially 
when the information might be used, at some future point in time, to 
wrongly detain, prosecute, convict, or even execute a European citizen? 
This reluctance is not simply a matter of moral scruples or political sur-
vival. In many European countries, it is the law of data protection. The 
government can transfer personal data only to countries with an “ade-
quate” level of data protection.341 And by this point it should be clear 
that the United States would not count as one of those countries.342 
                                                                                                                      
341 See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, 
BGBl. I at 904, § 4(2) (F.R.G.). 
342 The adequacy of U.S. law for purposes of EU personal data transfers has been the 
object of extensive study. See Shaffer, supra note 23, at 22–38. See generally Commission De-
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third-country transfers of personal data to assist with law enforcement or national security 
fall outside the scope of EU data protection law. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Eur. 
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1. Legal Obstacles to Intelligence Exchange 
 The law governing data transfers to the United States and other 
third countries is mostly national. On this subject, the Council of 
Europe Convention has little to say.343 Unfortunately, national laws vary 
even more than the usual in their treatment of third-country transfers 
for national security and law enforcement purposes. Both the German 
and French data protection laws, however, impose blanket bans on 
transfers to inadequate third countries; they create such limited excep-
tions to those bans that the routine exchange of intelligence with an 
inadequate country would be prohibited.344 
 Under the German data protection law, 
transfer [of personal data] to foreign [non-EU], suprana-
tional or international bodies . . . shall not be effected in so 
far as the data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding 
transfer, in particular if an adequate level of data protection 
is not guaranteed . . . .345 
The only exception to this prohibition is national defense or certain 
duties under international law: 
 [The prohibition] shall not apply if transfer is necessary in 
order to enable a public body of the Federation to perform its 
duties for compelling reasons of defence or to discharge su-
pranational or international duties in the field of crisis man-
agement or conflict prevention or for humanitarian meas-
ures.346 
 To obtain personal data from Germany, the U.S. government 
would have to argue that the data involved a security threat to both 
                                                                                                                      
Parliament v. Council, paras. 55–59, http://eur.lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=CELEX:62004J0317:EN:HTML (May 30, 2006). 
343 A protocol to the Convention, signed in 2001, would require the parties to allow 
transfers to third states only if such states provided an “adequate level of protection.” See 
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transbor-
der Data Flows, art. 2.1, Nov. 8, 2001, E.T.S. 181. As of January 2007, however, this protocol 
had been ratified by only fifteen countries. Moreover, the parties are allowed to derogate 
from the adequacy requirement for a number of reasons including a “legitimate prevailing 
interest, especially important public interests.” Id. art 2.2(a). 
344 See Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 68, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 
2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 
2006; Federal Data Protection Act, May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 904, § 4b(2) (F.R.G.). 
345 Federal Data Protection Act § 4b(2). 
346 Id. 
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Germany and the United States and that, as a result, the transfer would 
advance the purpose of defending Germany from foreign attack.347 The 
only other avenue available to the U.S. government would be an 
agreement with Germany promising that it will treat personal informa-
tion in accordance with the basic principles of German privacy law.348 
The German data protection law directs officials to assess adequacy “in 
the light of all circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or 
a category of data transfer operations.”349 An international agreement 
would count as one of those circumstances. 
 Likewise, under the French data protection law, personal data 
may not be transferred to a state outside the European Union if that 
state “does not provide a sufficient level of protection of individuals’ 
privacy, liberties and fundamental rights with regard to the actual or 
possible processing of their personal data.”350 There are a number of 
exceptions to this prohibition, the most relevant to intelligence gath-
ering being a determination that a particular transfer would serve 
“the protection of the public interest.”351 Moreover, when personal 
data processing “involves State security, defense, or public safety,”352 or 
its “purpose is the prevention, investigation, or proof of criminal of-
fences, the prosecution of offenders or the execution of security sen-
tences or security measures,”353 transfers to inadequate third countries 
may be authorized by special government decree.354 Before promul-
gating such a decree, however, the government must solicit the opin-
ions of CNIL and the Conseil d’Etat (France’s highest administrative 
body).355 The government must also be convinced that privacy rights 
will be afforded a “sufficient level of protection” in the receiving 
                                                                                                                      
347 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 
904, § 4b(2) (F.R.G.). 
348 See id. § 4c(2). 
349 Id. § 4b(3). 
350 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 68, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 
2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 
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352 Id. art. 26.I(1). 
353 Id. art. 26.I(2). 
354 Id. art. 69. In 2003, a law was enacted to improve internal security. Among its many 
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No. 2003-39 of Mar. 18, 2003, art. 24, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 19, 2003, 
p. 476. 
355 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6., 1978, art. 69. 
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country.356 Under French law, therefore, routine exchanges of intelli-
gence-related personal data with the United States can only occur 
upon a finding of a “sufficient level of protection.”357 Given the nu-
merous discrepancies between the two systems of data privacy, such a 
finding could only occur through an international agreement of the 
kind discussed in relation to Germany. 
 In addition to German, French, and other national laws, a measure 
under negotiation in the European Union, once finalized, might also 
create difficulties for information exchange with the United States.358 
In this instance, the main impact would be on personal data sought to 
investigate past crimes or to prevent imminent offenses, a matter more 
for the police—the law enforcement side of the FBI—than a national 
security agency like the NSA.359 Since the early 1990s, the European 
Union has become increasingly active in promoting cooperation on 
criminal matters among national police forces, prosecutors, and crimi-
nal courts. To ensure that different levels of privacy protection do not 
make national authorities reluctant to exchange personal information 
amongst themselves, a Framework Directive is being negotiated that 
would set down common data protection standards for all European 
authorities responsible for “preventing and combating crime.”360 Under 
the latest available draft, information sent by one Member State to an-
other may not be transferred onwards to a third country unless consent 
to the transfer has been given by the original Member State and an 
adequate level of data protection exists in the third country.361 The only 
caveat to the adequacy requirement is for transfers that are “absolutely 
necessary in order to safeguard the essential interests of a Member 
State or for the prevention of imminent serious danger threatening 
public security or a specific person or persons.”362 As in the German 
and French laws, an international agreement with a third country, 
stipulating the conditions under which data will be processed, can con-
                                                                                                                      
356 Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 69, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 
2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 
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357 See id. 
358 See generally Proposal for a Council Framework Directive on the Protection of Personal Data 
Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, Doc. No. 
6450/5 REV 5 (2006) [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Framework Directive]. 
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stitute grounds for an adequacy finding, even if the country’s domestic 
privacy law is unsatisfactory. Again, therefore, an international agree-
ment would be the only way in which the U.S. government could obtain 
routine access to European personal data. 
2. Bilateral Agreements to Exchange Information 
 A number of bilateral agreements do allow for information ex-
change between Europe and the United States. These agreements, 
known as treaties on mutual legal assistance (“MLATs”), guarantee ac-
cess to information in connection with criminal investigations.363 Police 
authorities in one state may request from police authorities in another 
state public or private records located there.364 MLATs, however, are 
not particularly useful to the American intelligence community. Under 
the terms of MLATs, before a state may request information on an indi-
vidual, it must show that the individual is suspected of a crime or has 
been charged with a criminal offense.365 In other words, MLATs cover 
only criminal investigations, not national security programs designed to 
ward off future threats.366 
 MLATs have another limitation: they contain numerous exceptions 
to the duty of cooperation. Many, including the French and German 
MLATs, do not require states to assist with requests for government re-
cords; such assistance is left to the requested state’s discretion.367 Fur-
thermore, a state is allowed to deny a request for assistance or to attach 
conditions to such a request if “execution of the request would preju-
dice [the requested state’s] sovereignty, security, public order, or other 
essential interests.”368 Data protection would be considered one of 
those essential interests, hence preventing cooperation. A recently ne-
gotiated MLAT between the European Union and the United States is 
specifically directed at removing the data protection impediment: it 
would bar European countries from routinely invoking data protection 
                                                                                                                      
363 See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 1, 
Oct. 14, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-27 [hereinafter U.S.-F.R.G. MLAT] (not yet in 
force); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Fr., art. 1, Dec. 10, 
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365 See id. art. 1; U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 1. 
366 See U.S.-F.R.G. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 1; U.S.-Fr. MLAT, supra note 363, art. 1; see 
also Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-EU, arts. 4.1(b), 8, 
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as grounds for denying U.S. requests for assistance.369 But because of 
this bar and other provisions, it is uncertain that the MLAT will be rati-
fied on the European side. Some argue that, without guarantees from 
the United States, this provision would breach European human rights 
law.370 
 Recently, the U.S. government has sought to move beyond infor-
mation for criminal investigations and to obtain European personal 
data in connection with national security operations.371 Compared to 
the criminal context, vastly more information is needed in national se-
curity investigations to ascertain whether vague suspicions of possible 
future harms have some basis in fact or must be dismissed. It should 
come as no surprise, therefore, that agreement on this type of informa-
tion exchange has been even more elusive than in the area of criminal 
investigations. 
 To date, the principal example of this type of cooperation on na-
tional security matters—or, more accurately, transatlantic fractious-
ness—is the transfer of European airline passenger data to the U.S. 
government.372 After September 11, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (the “CBP”) began demanding access to European 
airline passenger data well before European airplanes took off from 
European airports to land in the United States.373 Part of the purpose 
was quite innocuous: to check for suspected terrorists and to require 
that they be stopped from boarding planes bound for the United 
States.374 But the other purpose—and the associated privacy risks— 
raised red flags for the European authorities: the data was to be used to 
identify individuals requiring surveillance while in the United States, 
either immediately or at a future time if their subsequent behavior gave 
rise to a suspicion of criminal activity.375 The method by which the pas-
senger data was to be transferred to the CBP was through a so-called 
pull system: the CBP was to have direct access to the data contained in 
                                                                                                                      
369 U.S.-EU MLAT, supra note 366, art. 9.2(b) (“Generic restrictions with respect to the 
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the airline passenger systems of European carriers—systems located in 
Europe, not the United States.376 This clearly constituted an extraterri-
torial exercise of regulatory jurisdiction by the United States. But these 
airplanes, of course, must eventually land in the United States, at which 
point they come squarely within the reach of U.S. jurisdiction. Practi-
cally speaking, this meant that if the airlines failed to cooperate with 
the CBP’s earlier demands, entry of their passengers to the United 
States could be denied or delayed and civil fines could be imposed. 
 Despite these enforcement tools, European airlines did not accede 
to U.S. demands immediately. Why was cooperation not forthcoming? 
This is even more surprising given that the punitive measures were ac-
tually imposed in some instances: passengers on European carriers 
were sometimes stuck for hours on U.S. runways, waiting to be allowed 
entry into the United States. The airlines did not cooperate for some of 
the same reasons that the transatlantic exchange of personal data be-
tween spy and police agencies has been so difficult: under European 
law, such transfers would have to be authorized by a specific piece of 
regulation and could not occur absent a finding of the adequacy of the 
data protection guarantees in the receiving country.377 In other words, 
by satisfying the demands of the U.S. government, the airlines would be 
breaking European law. The airlines, faced with this dilemma, went to 
the European Commission seeking action that would allow them to op-
erate their transatlantic flights in compliance with the law on both sides 
of the Atlantic. It took almost three years of diplomatic wrangling for 
the United States and the European Union to come to an understand-
ing. Finally, in the spring of 2004, the two sides signed an agreement 
specifying the type of passenger data that could be gathered from 
                                                                                                                      
376 Agreement Between the European Community and the United States of America 
on the Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, May 28, 2004, p. 5, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/pnr/2004-05- 
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Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of 
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377 See, e.g., Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, art. 68, J.O. [Official Gazette of France], 
Aug. 7, 2004, p. 227, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, and Law No. 2006-64 of 
Jan. 23, 2006 (French statute requiring a “sufficient level of protection” of privacy in a non-
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European airline reservation systems and the conditions under which it 
would have to be handled.378 
 Under the terms of this agreement, the CBP is allowed access to 
thirty-four out of thirty-nine fields contained in airline reservation sys-
tems under an individual’s passenger name record (“PNR”) number.379 
This includes the individual’s address, email address, telephone num-
ber, travel itinerary, round-trip or one-way ticket purchase, and pay-
ment information.380 If the information is never manually accessed, it 
must be erased after three-and-a-half years; otherwise, it must be erased 
after eight years, with an exception for information that was used in a 
government investigation.381 The purposes for which the personal in-
formation may be used are limited to “preventing and combating” the 
following crimes: terrorism and related crimes, other serious crimes— 
including organized crime—that are transnational in nature, and flight 
from warrants or custody for those crimes.382 The CBP is barred from 
processing personal data considered, under European law, to be “sensi-
tive data.”383 Only the CBP may access the data on a routine basis; it 
may transfer European passenger data to other law enforcement and 
counterterrorism agencies but only if it first determines that transfer of 
a particular passenger’s data would further the crime-fighting purposes 
outlined in the agreement.384 Those government agencies are held to 
the same standards as the CBP, including the restrictions on informa-
tion sharing with other government agencies.385 Additionally, passen-
gers are guaranteed access to their personal information under the 
Freedom of Information Act.386 Finally, the Chief Privacy Officer of the 
Department of Homeland Security is recognized as exercising many of 
the same oversight functions as independent privacy agencies in 
Europe.387 
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 From the perspective of European privacy advocates, this agree-
ment was far from satisfactory.388 It did render unlawful, however, the 
kind of data mining and data sharing conducted as part of government 
programs like the NSA call database. But after only two years of opera-
tion, it appeared that the PNR agreement might unravel. On May 30, 
2006, the European Court of Justice found the PNR agreement to be 
unlawful under European law.389 The grounds for the Court’s judgment 
had nothing to do with privacy. In fact, the Advocate General’s opinion 
that preceded the Court’s judgment had found that the agreement re-
spected fundamental human rights guarantees on data protection.390 
Rather, the Court found that the European Commission and the Coun-
cil had exceeded their jurisdiction because they had concluded the 
agreement under the common market pillar, when the purpose of the 
data transfers was not to facilitate trade, but to prevent and investigate 
crime.391 Therefore, the European Union announced to the United 
States on July 3, 2006 that it was withdrawing and, on September 30, 
2006, the agreement terminated.392 
 The big question following the Court of Justice’s decision was 
what, if anything, would replace the PNR agreement. On the European 
side, the strategy was to sign an identical agreement between the same 
parties (the United States and the European Union, and not individual 
European countries as some had suggested), just under the correct pil-
lar covering criminal matters.393 By the time the negotiations were con-
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cluded on October 6, 2006, however, it was clear that this ambition had 
not been realized.394 The current agreement, which still must be signed 
and ratified by the Council, relies on the data protection undertakings 
entered into by the U.S. government in 2004 as part of the first round 
of negotiations.395 The undertakings implemented into U.S. law the 
terms of the PNR agreement based on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (the “DHS’s”) statutory authority.396 These undertakings re-
main in effect.397 But they have been undermined by a new Letter of 
Interpretation that sets out how the DHS, the CBP’s parent agency, will 
interpret the undertakings.398 In the Letter of Interpretation, the DHS 
states that European passenger data may be shared with all agencies 
exercising counterterrorism functions, without any showing that such 
data is relevant to a specific investigation;399 that all the data contained 
in European passenger records systems may be requested, not only the 
thirty-four items specified in the undertakings;400 and that the data may 
be retained indefinitely.401 
 A similar set of demands for European personal data has been 
made by the U.S. government on the banking industry.402 In the sum-
mer of 2006, it was revealed that ever since the events of September 11, 
2001, the Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommuni-
cation (“SWIFT”) has been transferring massive amounts of data on 
international bank transfers to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.403 
SWIFT is a cooperative, established under Belgian law, of financial insti-
tutions located throughout the world.404 It runs a network designed to 
execute international bank transfers.405 It has two operations centers, 
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one in Europe and one in the United States.406 All messages ordering 
payments between banks are stored, in duplicate, at these two opera-
tions centers for 124 days.407 After September 11, the U.S. Treasury De-
partment began issuing administrative subpoenas for the data held in 
SWIFT’s U.S. operations center.408 Although the precise figures are se-
cret for national security reasons, according to one report the data 
transferred to the Treasury Department in any given year could very 
well include all the messages sent via the SWIFT system, which in 2005 
numbered 2,518,290,000.409 
 After this came to light, a number of European data protection 
authorities called for action.410 Because much of the transactional in-
formation came from Europe, it was clear to all concerned that Euro-
pean privacy law was triggered. In fact, from the beginning, SWIFT 
knew that it was running the risk of violating European privacy law; it 
requested and received a “comfort letter” from the U.S. Treasury De-
partment in which the Department pledged to support SWIFT in the 
event that it was later sued by foreign governments or third parties.411 
The Belgian Data Protection Commission took the lead in the investi-
gation because, under European data protection rules, it is the privacy 
agency with the strongest claim of jurisdiction over SWIFT.412 In the fall 
of 2006, the Belgian Commission categorically condemned SWIFT and, 
indirectly, the U.S. government.413 It is worthwhile repeating the Bel-
gian Commission in full: 
 Considering that the recipient of the data (US Treasury) 
was never subjected to an appropriate level of protection in 
accordance with article 21 of the DPL [Belgian Data Protec-
tion Law] and Directive 95/46/EC [the EU Directive], the 
Commission is of the opinion that SWIFT violated . . . [the 
Belgian Data Protection Law]. It can be considered a serious 
error of judgement on the part of SWIFT to subject a mass 
quantity of personal data in a secret and systematic manner for 
years to the surveillance of the US Treasury without at the 
same time informing the European authorities and the Com-
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mission in order to reach a solution under Belgian and Euro-
pean law.414 
3. The Relevance of Leverage 
 Although it is too early to tell with the bank transfer data, in the 
case of airline passenger data it does not appear that Europe has been 
able to exert much leverage over the United States. The state control 
over territory that has served traditionally as the basis for regulatory 
jurisdiction also influences which approach to privacy will prevail, 
American or European.415 European airlines wish to do business with 
the United States. To do so, they must land and deplane their passen-
gers at U.S. airports. To enjoy this privilege, European carriers are 
forced to comply with the U.S. government’s requests for personal in-
formation. And Europe has few carrots or sticks to use in negotiating 
privacy guarantees for such information. A European privacy authority 
might threaten to bring prosecutions in its national courts against both 
European and American airlines for complying with the CBP’s infor-
mation requests. But such prosecutions against national carriers would 
be difficult as a matter of domestic politics and the same prosecutions 
against American airlines would risk triggering retaliation from the 
American side. 
 The relative power of the United States and Europe in this type of 
situation suggests that the outcome of the SWIFT episode will be simi-
lar. To process transatlantic bank transfers, bank orders must be sent 
from Europe to the United States where, for good business reasons, 
they are stored for a certain period of time. Because the bank orders 
are in storage on American territory—and because SWIFT has signifi-
cant economic assets in the United States associated with such stor-
age—it is easy to compel compliance with any government order. 
Again, the European Union has few tools to pressure the United States 
to adopt better privacy guarantees. Because SWIFT is a cooperative with 
a significant European membership, a suit against SWIFT would en-
counter the same domestic opposition as a suit against a European air-
line. A European government might go after the financial institutions 
that are part of the cooperative, some of which are undoubtedly Ameri-
can, but that would carry all the same political risks as suing American 
airlines. 
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 Another episode of transatlantic discord—involving personal data 
of particular value to the intelligence community—illustrates the dif-
ferent outcome when the territorial advantage is held by the Europe-
ans. This time, the Americans sought access to the information on 
transnational crime contained in Europol’s central database.416 Because 
the two sides were so bitterly divided over data protection, the terms 
under which access would be permitted had to be negotiated in stages. 
First came an agreement, signed on December 6, 2001, on the ex-
change of strategic and technical information on matters such as the 
routes used by smugglers.417 This was followed, a full year later, by an 
agreement on the exchange of personal data.418 This second agreement 
requires that requests for information be made in writing and that such 
requests “provide a concise statement identifying the authority making 
the request, the matter under consideration, the reason for the request, 
and the nature of the assistance sought.”419 Such requests must be 
made in connection with “specific” criminal offenses or for “specific” 
analytical purposes.420 The agreement therefore does not contemplate 
wholesale access to information contained in the Europol database, as 
has been achieved in the case of airline passenger reservation systems. 
Most importantly, the parties retain full discretion to deny such re-
quests for personal information and they may subject disclosure to 
various conditions, including privacy guarantees.421 The difference in 
privacy laws has effectively prevented the United States from obtaining 
routine access to the vast reservoir of information on transnational 
criminal activity held by Europol. Once, as is planned, Europol obtains 
access to the Schengen Information System, that pool of information 
will become even more extensive.422 
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4. The Failure of Predictions of Regulatory Convergence 
 Thus the transatlantic difference persists, notwithstanding the 
burden on business and the interest of the U.S. government in obtain-
ing more European police data to better fight crime and terrorism. 
This outcome defies predictions of regulatory convergence in some 
quarters.423 A couple of years ago, Gregory Shaffer observed that U.S. 
privacy standards were being “ratcheted up” to the level of data protec-
tion afforded under European law.424 Shaffer argued that the logic of 
trade, reinforced by nongovernmental advocacy networks, had pro-
duced this phenomenon and would continue to do so.425 Building on 
the work of David Vogel and others, Shaffer found that American firms 
that did business in Europe had an incentive to adopt the higher, more 
restrictive European privacy standard for all of their business, including 
their non-European operations.426 This they accomplished by self-
regulation and by putting pressure on their American regulators to 
adopt standards that were compatible with the European ones.427 At the 
same time, because data privacy is a policy problem characterized by 
externalities, Shaffer hypothesized that European regulators would 
seek to influence foreign jurisdictions; data can be sent abroad in sec-
onds, at which point privacy is at the mercy of foreign laws and regula-
tors.428 In Shaffer’s account, these forces of globalization have com-
bined with the advocacy efforts of privacy rights groups to produce 
higher privacy standards in the United States.429 
 There certainly is good evidence for Shaffer’s claims. The more 
recent experience, however, shows the limits of the argument. Even 
when the economic interests of big players in the global marketplace 
such as airlines and banks are at stake, a strong countervailing regula-
tory policy will trump the trade interest in convergence. In this in-
stance, that opposing policy interest is government access to informa-
tion to assist with law enforcement and national security. Furthermore, 
when an activity is entrusted to state—not private—actors, the pressure 
to develop a single modus operandi applicable in all jurisdictions is sig-
nificantly lower. Policing and national defense are the prime examples 
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of activities handled by government actors, not private firms. And the 
resistance to convergence of such actors is evident in the continuing 
difference in how police and spy agencies handle personal data in the 
United States and Europe. This difference persists even though a rela-
tively small policy shift on the American side would produce significant 
advantages in the form of easier access to valuable personal data, for 
instance, information on Islamic extremists living in Europe. 
B. Understanding American Privacy Law 
 To understand the possibilities of transforming American privacy 
law based on European law, it is necessary to review the comparative 
method and the critiques of the method. It is also critical to appreciate 
the history of information privacy law. Originally, the two legal systems 
appeared to share near-identical commitments to information privacy, 
but, over time, they have diverged radically for reasons explored in this 
Section. Mindful of the limits of the comparative method and informed 
by the reasons for the transatlantic divergence, this Article makes a few 
recommendations for the reform of American privacy law. 
1. The Comparative Method 
 In some ways, this Article is a conventional exercise in comparative 
law. It takes a presumed problem—safeguarding privacy in the face of 
government programs like the call records program—and explores the 
solutions to that problem in two different legal systems. The so-called 
“functionalist” method has been employed in countless pieces of indi-
vidual comparative law research.430 It has also served as the framework 
for a number of well-known collaborative projects, including Rudolf 
Schlesinger’s project on the formation of contracts431 and the Common 
Core Project being run out of the University of Trento, Italy.432 
 This collaborative work is especially revealing of the details of the 
functionalist method. Research design in such enterprises must be 
made particularly explicit at the outset, to guarantee that the results 
will be cumulative and will be able to serve as the basis for more gen-
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eral conclusions. The starting point is a factual hypothetical, abstracted 
as much as possible from the law of any one country. Scholars from dif-
ferent legal systems are then asked how their system would handle the 
problem: how a judge would decide the case, and based on which rules, 
general principles, doctrinal reasoning, and, if relevant, rules and insti-
tutions outside that particular subject area, such as civil procedure and 
constitutional law. Those answers are then synthesized to discern the 
extent of commonality and difference among the many legal systems. 
 An example from the Common Core’s study on “Pure Economic 
Loss in Europe” will illustrate: 
Case 1 
 While maneuvering his mechanical excavator, an employee 
of the Acme Road Works cuts the cable belonging to the pub-
lic utility which delivers electricity to Beta Factory. The unex-
pected black-out causes damage to machinery and the loss of 
two days production. Beta Factory’s owner claims compensa-
tion from the excavator (Acme) not only for the damage to 
his machinery but also for the damage caused by the loss of 
production.433 
Whether and for what reasons Beta Factory would be able to recover 
for loss of production, together with a number of other hypotheticals, 
was analyzed by scholars from thirteen different legal systems.434 Their 
country reports, together with a synthesis report and a historical chap-
ter, were published seven laborious years later.435 
 This Article, in contrast to the Common Core, has only one hypo-
thetical—a database of all the calls made and received by the clients 
of two major telecommunications providers is being used by an intel-
ligence agency to detect terrorists. It only has two legal systems—the 
United States and Europe. Otherwise, the method is very similar. 
 This Article is at the same time an unconventional exercise in 
comparative law. The field of comparative law has long been domi-
nated—some would say “obsessed” —by the problems of contracts, 
torts, and property. By contrast, this comparative analysis deals with a 
problem of public law.436 In the past, comparing constitutional and 
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administrative law was dismissed as fruitless. Such law, unlike private 
law, was believed to be so unscientific and value-laden that comparison 
would not be able to yield any useful insights.437 Because public law was 
believed to embody the distinct historical and political experience of 
the nation state, comparing public law could not reveal any basic truths 
that could serve as the grounds for universal, international regulation 
of different areas of human activity—traditionally the main purpose of 
comparative law.438 
 Today, comparative public law is still seen as qualitatively differ-
ent from comparative private law.439 The institutional setting in which 
public law operates is still believed to be more historically and cultur-
ally contingent than the sphere of civil society relations in which pri-
vate law applies.440 As John Bell argues: 
 In public law, the core function of law is distinctive from 
private law. Public law is about defining and controlling the 
powers and activities of government. This is not the function 
of private law, which exists to provide frameworks within 
which individuals can undertake voluntarily, and to provide 
remedies when they exceed the bounds of the acceptable use 
of private power . . . . Now, to talk at a very high level of ab-
straction, one can discuss the basic principles of liberal de-
mocratic government and the control of abuse of power . . . . 
But if we are going to discuss the role of law, we need to de-
scend into several layers of detail, so the question becomes: 
how do you govern in a liberal and democratic way in a soci-
ety divided on linguistic grounds which has a relatively short 
history of independent government and which has a broadly 
French tradition of institutions (Belgium), as opposed to how 
do you govern a long-standing unitary state with religious divi-
sions and with a distinct tradition of governmental institutions 
(Netherlands).441 
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 The greater cultural and historical embeddedness of public law, 
however, is no longer perceived as an obstacle to comparison. Indeed, 
comparing constitutional and administrative law is becoming standard 
fare in the academy.442 This Article is part of the academic trend to 
remedy the earlier “obsession” with private law. 
 Another point of departure from the conventional method is this 
Article’s emphasis on the difference between the American and Euro-
pean approaches to privacy in the face of government data mining. 
One classic start date for comparative law is the founding of the Inter-
national Congress for Comparative Law by Edouard Lambert and Ray-
mond Saleilles in 1900.443 Their ambition was to find, through com-
parison, a common law of mankind.444 And, over one hundred years 
later, this ambition still guides the comparative work of organizations 
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. The 
cosmopolitan ideal explains, at least in part, the traditional ontological 
choice in favor of similarity: to see similar problems of social organiza-
tion across all legal systems, and to see similar solutions to those prob-
lems, albeit accomplished through different types of rules, styles of rea-
soning, legal institutions, and social practices.445 
  To be fair, this analysis of the NSA call records program is prem-
ised on a good deal of similarity across societies. After all, the United 
States and Europe share a common Enlightenment heritage. Privacy is 
valued by both Europeans and Americans. In both places, privacy is de-
fined as a certain degree of freedom from the scrutiny of others and a 
certain amount of autonomy in making life decisions. And when a gov-
ernment acquires information about individuals, both Europeans and 
Americans feel that their privacy is threatened. Without privacy or a 
possible government harm, the hypothetical would have no meaning. 
The bulk of the discussion, however, is devoted to revealing how the 
solutions—the legal categories, the sources of law, and the outcomes— 
are all different. 
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2. The Difference: European Versus American Liberty 
 According to the legal historian James Whitman, European privacy 
law protects dignity, while American privacy law protects liberty.446 In 
Whitman’s view, the law in the two places is informed by two very dif-
ferent cultural values: protecting one’s reputation against the vulgari-
ties of the market and the media in Europe, and protecting individual 
freedom from intrusions of the state, especially in one’s home, in 
America.447 This argument has intrigued and persuaded many privacy 
scholars. It explains one very puzzling difference between American 
and European privacy law: the apathy of American tort and constitu-
tional law when confronted with even the grossest of privacy abuses if 
the offender happens to be a private actor, especially the media.448 It 
also fits with the very different rhetoric of the American and European 
case law. In American cases, the existence of a privacy interest turns on 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, an issue 
that is generally addressed by examining constitutional history and so-
cial practices—all of which point to the home as the place in which in-
dividuals have been traditionally allowed to conduct their affairs free 
from the gaze of others.449 By contrast, European privacy cases, espe-
cially the German ones, begin from the need to preserve human dig-
nity and to develop personal autonomy.450 In pursuing these core val-
ues, the home is always protected, but so too are spaces and personal 
matters outside the home. 
 Although this analysis has considerable merit, Whitman obscures 
an important aspect of European privacy law. True, European privacy 
law promotes interpersonal respect among individuals. But it also pro-
tects privacy against the state. And it is not always true, as Whitman 
argues, that “state action will raise American hackles much more often 
than European ones.”451 Indeed, the argument of this Article is that, 
in the context of antiterrorism data mining, European law protects 
liberty interests more than American law. At least European spy agen-
cies tell their citizens when their personal data is being collected and 
combined and, depending on the results, sent to the police for fur-
ther action, a lot more than can be said for American spy agencies. 
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 How can this somewhat counterintuitive difference between Am-
erican and European law be explained? This transatlantic difference is 
even more surprising in light of the specific origins of information pri-
vacy. 
 When individual privacy in the age of information technology first 
became a policy problem, American policymakers were every bit as ac-
tive as their European counterparts. In fact, a case can be made that 
European privacy law was influenced by American law and policy. The 
book Privacy and Freedom, written by the American scholar Alan Westin 
and published in 1967, was one of the first systematic treatments of the 
impact of computers on privacy.452 It was widely read in both the United 
States and Europe.453 By the early 1970s, legislative and regulatory pro-
posals were being floated on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 In the United States, this was the era of the Nixon scandals. The 
first data privacy proposal came from the Department of Housing, 
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”).454 In 1973, HEW issued an influen-
tial report on government databases of personal records.455 To as-
suage public distrust of such databases, the report recommended that 
all government departments adhere to a Code of Fair Information 
Practices.456 Many of these fair information practices were soon after 
incorporated in the Privacy Act of 1974. When, in 1980, a set of data 
protection guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, a number of the American legal prin-
ciples were included.457 These guidelines, in turn, influenced the ne-
gotiations on the Council of Europe Convention.458 It is no wonder 
then that the terms of the U.S. Privacy Act sound awfully similar to 
those of the Council of Europe Convention.459 
 Rewinding the tape again to the early 1970s, the first national data 
protection laws adopted in Europe and the United States displayed re-
markable similarities. This is well documented by political scientist 
Colin Bennett in his study of data protection in the United States, Swe-
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den, Germany, and the United Kingdom.460 In his study, Bennett found 
that the “problem” of privacy in the information technology age was 
similar in all four countries: it contained a humanistic dimension pro-
tecting individual dignity against the alienating aspects of mass society 
and information technology; a political dimension designed to prevent 
a tyrannical state from using information technology—and personal 
information—as a tool of oppression; and an instrumental dimension 
to advance other nonprivacy values, such as equality and accuracy.461 
He also found that the national legislation was similar even though all 
countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, were responding 
to their own internal politics and institutional concerns.462 The only 
real difference was in the regulatory styles used to advance the privacy 
goals—informal and negotiated in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
bureaucratic in Sweden, and legalistic in the United States.463 These 
early transnational similarities were reinforced by the focus, in both the 
United States and Europe, on public sector information abuses. Different 
from the U.S. Privacy Act, European laws also regulated private sector 
data processing.464 These provisions, however, were included almost as 
an afterthought. At the time, the principal organization with the re-
sources, technology, and motive to process large amounts of personal 
data was the state. 
 What changed? For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to 
consider the differences in private sector regulation in depth. Suffice it 
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to say that, as the technology became more advanced, enabling a wide 
array of private actors to engage in data processing, the scope of Euro-
pean regulation expanded, too. The naturalness with which the primar-
ily public sector framework was extended to the private sector can be 
put down to a number of factors: the original legislative choice to cover 
private data processing; the constitutional practice—different from the 
American constitutional framework—of applying rights to both gov-
ernment and private actors (horizontal effect or drittwirkung); and the 
dignity values identified by Whitman.465 
 But why did the two systems diverge so radically in the public sec-
tor? After all, the laws contained similar sets of legal provisions.466 And 
compared to the private sector, the changes wrought by technology to 
government information collection and manipulation have not been 
nearly as radical. In other words, the contrast cannot be ascribed to 
protecting privacy in the face of new information technology, a new 
policy problem that might be addressed differently by the different so-
cieties. Rather, at least three institutional forces appear to have been at 
work, forces not tied directly to the substance of information privacy 
policy. 
a. Enforcement 
 As already noted, the first major difference separating American 
from European data protection laws is enforcement. In the American 
case, the primary enforcers are individual litigants; in the European 
case, they are independent privacy agencies.467 This is consistent with 
broader patterns of regulation in the two legal systems: Americans liti-
gate in court and Europeans negotiate with government agencies.468 
The American choice, however, appears to have been particularly ill-
suited to the realities of information privacy in the work of government 
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agencies. The injuries suffered by individuals—not to speak of the pol-
ity—when the government secretly undertakes a program like that for 
call records are generally not recognized by common law courts. When 
spying occurs through unobtrusive methods and without visible conse-
quences like a criminal prosecution or civil action, it is almost impossi-
ble to prove the injury element of a tort claim. In addition, suing the 
government is almost always more difficult than suing private parties.469 
Even though the Privacy Act lifts the government’s sovereign immunity, 
it still benefits from a form of qualified immunity: most violations of the 
Act must be proven “intentional or willful” before a plaintiff can re-
cover.470 A government agency with the authority to investigate other 
agencies for privacy violations, to recommend changes if such violations 
are found, and, in the last resort, to impose an administrative sanction 
or to take an offending government official to court, is likely to be a 
better enforcer than private attorneys general. 
 Administrative agencies and courts, of course, are not just enforc-
ers but also policymakers. And, as compared to generalist courts, ad-
ministrative agencies have distinct advantages. Because their resources 
and authority are committed to specific government policies, they de-
velop expertise, historical memory, and bureaucratic dedication in 
their policy areas. When political and social realities change, adminis-
trative agencies stay put; they are there to promote the goals of earlier 
legislative enactments. Indeed, privacy agencies in Europe would 
probably describe themselves as policymakers first, enforcers second. 
Their resources are devoted largely to vetting government proposals for 
proportionality and making policy recommendations in the face of new 
technological threats to privacy. 
 The lack of a similar institution in the United States is a big part of 
the explanation for transatlantic difference. There is no one to tell a 
government agency that certain personal information—say, the toll re-
cords of all AT&T customers—is not really “relevant and necessary” to 
accomplishing the agency’s purpose;471 that the agency does not review 
its records often enough to make sure that they are up to date and ac-
curate, hence avoiding adverse consequences for individuals;472 or that 
what the agency considers to be a “routine use” of information which is 
“compatible with the purpose for which it was collected” really is not 
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compatible with such purposes, thereby precluding information shar-
ing with another government agency.473 Indeed, it is unnecessary to go 
abroad to understand the impact of the absence of a privacy agency. In 
most other cases in which information privacy has been regulated by 
Congress, an administrative agency has been charged with implementa-
tion: the Department of Health and Human Services for health privacy, 
the Federal Communications Commission for telemarketers, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission for children’s privacy online.474 In none of 
these areas has privacy been deemed quite as roundly and unanimously 
to have failed as in the case of the Privacy Act. 
b. Executive Power 
 The second part of the explanation for the transatlantic differ-
ence, especially since September 11, is the spectacular growth of execu-
tive power in the United States. This is a trend that began in the early 
1980s with the Reagan administration, first with the theory of the “uni-
tary executive,”475 then “presidential administration,”476 and now the 
“war against terror.”477 This is a well-documented phenomenon that 
cannot be explored in any depth here. It is critical to understand the 
rise of executive power, however, to understand the trajectory of infor-
mation privacy. The President’s aggressive assertions of executive 
power—and the failure of Congress and the courts to react—have 
shaped many policy areas, including information privacy. The NSA call 
records program is one, obvious illustration of this institutional logic. 
 Since the early 1980s, the experience of European executive 
branches has been quite the reverse. As the discussion of the European 
law illustrates, national law enforcement and spy agencies cannot sim-
ply take heed of one national privacy agency or one set of national 
courts.478 They operate in three different—in the sense of not hierar-
chically related—yet at the same time overlapping, legal systems: their 
national constitutional systems, the Council of Europe, and the Euro-
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pean Union. The rise of Europe as a political and legal entity has been 
possible only by virtue of huge losses of national sovereignty. Although 
in some ways this might strengthen executive branches—when national 
ministers go to Brussels to negotiate EU laws, their national parlia-
ments cannot exercise much oversight—on the whole, the integration 
process has brought more and more checks on national executive 
power.479 If a Ministry of Interior wished to push back against the broad 
reach of European data protection law, it would have to contend with a 
number of independent bodies: in the European Union, it would con-
tend with other Member States, the Court of Justice, and the Working 
Party of Data Protection Commissioners; in the Council of Europe, the 
European Court of Human Rights; and at the national level, its judicial 
branch and its independent privacy agency. By understanding this dif-
ferent configuration of executive power on the two sides of the Atlan-
tic, we can better understand why an area of public policy that began 
with equal enthusiasm in both places fared so differently over time. In 
the United States, privacy met with effective opposition from the execu-
tive branch. By contrast, in Europe, once the momentum for privacy 
got going—and was institutionalized in the form of privacy commis-
sioners and constitutional case law—it was very difficult for national 
governments to resist. 
c. The Nazi Experience 
 A third element that should be mentioned in seeking to explain 
the transatlantic difference is the European experience with the Nazis 
during World War II, an experience that has no American equivalent. 
Human rights law in Europe today, including privacy law, has been 
shaped by this Nazi past.480 This is not to say that privacy law was fash-
ioned simply as a reaction to that experience—national legal traditions 
were too solidly rooted to be swept away by fifteen or so years of his-
tory.481 But, as the historian Tony Judt puts it, for most of Western 
Europe, World War II was an experience in profound national humilia-
tion, a period in which the entire apparatus of state and society was put 
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at the service of a foreign occupying power.482 As for the Germans, at 
their feet lay responsibility for the atrocious human rights abuses of the 
Nazi regime. 
 Throughout Western Europe, it was widely feared that the manipu-
lation of the state for tyrannical ends might occur again.483 This fear 
was not abstract or irrational. Not only was there the Nazi past, but 
there was also the threat of Communism, which it must be remembered 
materialized even before World War II had officially come to an end. 
Hence all of the references to the dangers of Nazism and Communism 
by the drafters of the ECHR.484 And hence the German Constitutional 
Court’s repeated references to the lessons learned from Nazism in its 
own case law—including its privacy case law.485 
 It does not seem far-fetched to conclude that European rights, in-
cluding the right to stop large state bureaucracies from collecting and 
instrumentalizing vast quantities of information about individual citi-
zens, have been shaped by a particularly vivid understanding of the 
possible abuses of state power. In the United States, after President 
Nixon was forced to resign, Americans could forget how government 
power, including surveillance powers, could be used to subvert democ-
racy and suppress rights. With the Nazis in their past and the Commu-
nists possibly in their future, Europeans found it harder to forget. 
3. Critique and Reform 
 By expanding the realm of legal possibilities, comparison can serve 
as an impetus for legal change at home.486 Comparison brings to light 
the historical contingency—as opposed to cultural destiny—that in-
forms certain legal rules and categories. By demonstrating that our na-
tional, political, and social aspirations have been better served by the 
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law abroad, comparison can sharpen our sense of disappointment with 
our own legal experience. And, looking to other liberal societies can 
provide a range of legal solutions—solutions that answer to the funda-
mental moral commitments of liberal societies but, at the same time, 
do not impose intolerable costs on those societies. 
 This exploration of European privacy law serves the agenda of le-
gal change at home.487 By stressing that the point of departure, in the 
early 1970s, was very similar on both sides of the Atlantic, the contin-
gency of privacy law in the United States today is revealed. In my analy-
sis of European privacy law, I have attempted to show that, indeed, that 
law serves principles of transparency, democratic debate, and protec-
tion against overreaching government surveillance better than Ameri-
can law. And, in this Subsection, European law serves as a point of de-
parture for improving American law. 
a. Answering the Critiques of the Comparative Method 
 From the outset, two objections to this constructive comparative 
enterprise should be mentioned. First, some might say that even 
though the United States and Europe are, roughly speaking, both lib-
eral societies, because they do not share the same moral commitments 
and practical constraints, the privacy law of Europe cannot serve as a 
source of inspiration for the United States. But can it really be true that 
the United States is less committed to liberty than Europe? Do Ameri-
can citizens not feel a need to know about government programs de-
signed to monitor them, or to seek to confine such programs to the 
minimum necessary to protect them from terrorist threats? It might be, 
as argued earlier, that because of their different historical experiences, 
Americans today are less fearful than Europeans of abuses of govern-
ment power. The story with which this Article began—the near-escape 
from conscription of Norwegian men into the Nazi army based on cen-
sus records—is just that for most Americans. It is not lived history. But 
that good luck is not a particularly sound reason for safeguarding rights 
any less in the day-to-day practice of government surveillance. 
 Slightly more persuasive is the claim that European law has little to 
offer the United States because the practical constraints of the two so-
cieties are different. It is true that the United States, unlike Europe, is 
the world’s military hegemon. In threatening, or actually conducting, 
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military operations abroad, the intelligence needs of the United States 
are extensive. Moreover, because of such military operations, the 
United States might be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home, on 
American soil. Ultimately, however, such objections to comparison are 
unconvincing. It is difficult to understand the connection between un-
fettered data collection and data mining at home and military opera-
tions abroad. Not only is information gathering on individuals in the 
United States less likely than traditional military surveillance to garner 
intelligence on, say, Al Qaeda’s operations along the Pakistan-Afghan-
istan border, but the constraints placed by European law on personal 
data processing related to military operations abroad are mild, indeed. 
As for the threat of terrorist attacks on national territory, the United 
States might be a better symbolic target, but, logistically speaking, it is 
probably easier to organize and carry out such attacks in Europe. That 
difference has nothing to do with civil rights law and everything to do 
with the size and cohesiveness of European immigrant populations and 
Europe’s proximity to the Middle East. 
 A second objection to my constructive ambition is known in the 
comparative law literature as the “transplant problem.”488 Like the 
functionalist method, drawing on the results of comparison to make 
suggestions for law reform is a conventional use of comparative law.489 
But, according to the postmodern critique of the past decade or so, it is 
also a dangerous use of comparative law.490 The critics point to the sub-
stantial barriers to cross-cultural communication.491 Different societies 
are constituted by radically different systems of meaning that are inac-
cessible to most outsiders, certainly to casual academic tourists such as 
comparative lawyers. This, of course, is a caricature of the postmodern 
view. It highlights, however, one of the important insights of the post-
modern critique: the cultural distinctiveness and internal coherence of 
any system of legal rules, modes of reasoning, institutions, and social 
practices. 
 This radical pluralism complicates enormously the task of the 
comparative lawyer.492 It casts doubt on the ability of comparative law 
to identify any one area of social life to study across legal systems—to 
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identify the functionalist “problem.”493 Assuming a researcher is able 
to narrow the field of inquiry, once she goes abroad, it is highly likely 
that she will misinterpret the foreign law, arriving at wrong conclu-
sions as to the meaning and consequences of the law in that society. 
And, in the unlikely event that she is able to surmount all of those 
barriers, she will never be able to bring the foreign law back home. 
Even if foreign law appears to work better, it will never have the same 
effect in the different social and cultural terrain of home.494 
 In some regards, I am proposing to transplant the European law of 
privacy into American soil. It appears, however, that caution rather than 
paralysis is the best lesson to take away from the disciplinary debates of 
comparative law. The European privacy solution has a number of dif-
ferent components: a fundamental right to information privacy and a 
statutory scheme regulating personal data processing in the public and 
private sectors.495 The suggestion of this Article is that Americans bor-
row only from the statutory scheme, and only from that part curbing 
the government’s use of personal information. In essence, the sugges-
tion is not to transplant at all, but to reinforce the U.S. Privacy Act and, 
in doing so, to return to the original intent of 1974.496 
 At the present time, an American constitutional right to informa-
tion privacy is not worth pursuing. Such a constitutional right would 
trigger judicial review of government data-mining programs similar to 
the European proportionality inquiry, under the guise of substantive 
due process.497 Partly, this solution is unattractive because it is implau-
sible; it is extremely difficult to imagine the current Supreme Court 
expanding so dramatically the constitutional right to privacy. 
 Pressing for a constitutional right to information privacy, however, 
might be unwise also for reasons of the broader institutional context.498 
In Europe, the relationship between constitutional courts and legisla-
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tures tends to be symbiotic.499 It is not necessary to look far for examples 
of this relationship. The decision of the German constitutional court 
proclaiming a right of “informational self-determination” prompted a 
slew of federal and state laws to come into compliance with the constitu-
tional standards set down in that decision.500 Among these was an 
amended Federal Data Protection Act (“Act”), with the declaration, in 
the very first line, that the purpose of the Act was to “protect the indi-
vidual against his right to privacy being impaired through the handling 
of his personal data.”501 A number of additional changes were made to 
this Act to further the new, constitutionally mandated criteria for lawful 
personal data processing.502 In the European Union, too, this mutually 
reinforcing relationship exists. The case law of the European Court of 
Justice is often incorporated, word-for-word, in subsequent legislation 
and serves as a springboard for positive legislative measures in favor of 
basic rights.503 
 In the United States, according to a number of prominent ac-
counts, this relationship is quite different: when the U.S. Supreme 
Court takes action, Congress does nothing.504 And vice versa, when the 
Supreme Court fails to act, Congress steps in with legislation. Thus, 
when the Court refused to protect bank records under the Fourth 
Amendment, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act.505 
When the Court denied Fourth Amendment protection to pen-register 
information, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act.506 In other words, 
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the risk is that if the Supreme Court finds a right to information pri-
vacy, Congress will not regulate government data mining. Indeed, Con-
gress might test the limits of the right to information privacy by author-
izing intrusive federal programs that might—or might not—be struck 
down by the Supreme Court. 
 Yet, in this technologically complex area, a fine-tuned regulatory 
scheme is more essential to protecting the right than the rather blunt 
device of judicial review.507 In addition, at least to begin with, legislative 
reform is a more legitimate mode of accomplishing change than judge-
made law.508 The opportunities for democratic participation in the leg-
islative process are more extensive. Legislation can be more easily re-
vised over time; the difficulties of repealing a law pale in comparison 
with reversing Supreme Court precedent. The legislative branch, there-
fore, appears to be the venue best suited to a privacy reform agenda. 
 Nor would it be necessary for Americans to adopt a comprehensive 
data protection law, covering all data processing in both the private and 
public sectors. Without a doubt, European limitations on personal data 
processing in the market make government programs like the NSA call 
database vastly more difficult. This aspect of European data protection 
law also affords greater visibility and accountability to any such gov-
ernment initiative: there must be a law or regulation authorizing the 
government to request personal data and permitting private firms to 
keep personal data. A comprehensive U.S. data protection law, how-
ever, would require a radical change of the legal environment; market 
actors would be asked to limit their data processing operations across 
the board, not just in a few specific areas like health care, telecommu-
nications, and financial services, as under the current system.509 Such a 
change, moreover, might not be particularly well-suited to a common 
law legal system. A wide range of firm activities that are currently sub-
ject to the tort and contract law of common law courts would be swept 
into a statutory scheme, subject to the different mode of deciding and 
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enforcing duties entailed by such a scheme.510 And all of this upheaval 
would produce relatively little benefit for the problem at hand: it would 
not directly curb data mining by the government. 
b. Recommendations for Reform 
 A few changes to the U.S. Privacy Act would advance the cause of 
information privacy enormously.511 The ambition should be to close 
some of the gaps that have allowed for the divergence, over time, of the 
American and European systems. Many of these gaps, indeed, were not 
anticipated by the drafters of the Privacy Act but were produced by 
weak judicial enforcement combined with aggressive bureaucratic in-
terpretation. 
 First, it should be made absolutely clear that the Privacy Act 
catches all government programs that involve large-scale personal data 
processing. The kind of Orwellian, Big-Brother abuses against which 
the Privacy Act was directed are just as likely with antiterrorism data 
mining as with systems designed to retrieve information on welfare re-
cipients for purposes of determining their benefits. This broader cov-
erage might be achieved by rewriting the statute to include a new defi-
nition of the statutory term “system of records” or substituting that 
term with a new one. This change could also be accomplished by the 
judicial branch. The legal uncertainty concerning the scope of the Pri-
vacy Act—and whether it covers data-mining programs like the NSA call 
database—is largely a product of the inconsistent case law of the federal 
courts.512 This shortcoming, therefore, could very well be fixed by those 
same courts. 
 Second, the Privacy Act’s exemptions for intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies and their activities should be narrowed considera-
bly.513 These are the government bodies and public programs that are 
most dangerous to individual liberty. The potential for government 
abuse of private information is greatest when such information is col-
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lected by the police—or handed over to the police by government 
spies. No other organ of the state has the power to do as much harm to 
individual citizens. The very reason for these powers, of course, is the 
critical public safety mission with which the police are entrusted. Yet, 
the carefully constructed German and French exceptions for police 
forces and security agencies demonstrate that it is possible to strike a 
more reasonable compromise between individual privacy and public 
safety.514 The German and French examples demonstrate that it is not 
necessary to allow such agencies to go entirely unregulated. 
 Third, the exception in the Privacy Act for “routine uses” of per-
sonal data should be repealed.515 This exception has enabled federal 
agencies to share personal information with other federal agencies, as 
well as state and local bodies, virtually unchecked. If the routine use 
exception were not repealed, then much of the benefit gained from 
covering national security and law enforcement agencies would be lost; 
the restrictions on sharing private data with law enforcement agencies 
at the federal and state level would be laughable. Free-for-all informa-
tion sharing is precisely what has been condemned by the German 
Constitutional Court.516 In the United States, it is also cause for con-
cern in the more traditional area of wiretapping; the so-called FBI 
“wall” between law enforcement and intelligence officers was estab-
lished to prevent criminal prosecutors from using national security sur-
veillance to obtain information on all offenses, regardless of their seri-
ousness.517 The danger of using the far-reaching powers of spy agencies 
to investigate mundane crimes like tax evasion, either for legitimate 
public or illegitimate political reasons, is as present when personal data 
is collected and analyzed. A person’s phone records, combined with 
information on her bank transfers, can be as revealing to the police as 
her actual conversations. Whenever authorizing a new government 
program, therefore, agencies should be required to specify, up front, 
exactly how personal data will be used and under what conditions it will 
be transferred to other government agencies. 
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 Last, the enforcement scheme in the Privacy Act should be 
amended to include an independent privacy agency. An independent 
privacy agency would offer a solution to some of the most serious defi-
cits of the Privacy Act. This recommendation, of course, is inspired by 
the European institution, but it also has a solid domestic foundation. 
The original bill contained such an agency, but it was removed in the 
end as part of the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act.518 A 
later bill, proposed in 1991, would have established a Data Protection 
Board, with powers similar to those of European privacy agencies.519 
The bill passed in the House of Representatives, but never made it 
through the Senate.520 
 The consequences of the absence of an administrative agency have 
already been explored here in explaining the divergent paths of privacy 
law in the United States and Europe.521 For the present purposes of re-
form, however, the deficiencies of the current system should be re-
viewed with more precision. Under the Privacy Act, individuals have a 
right of action for injunctive relief and damages against the govern-
ment.522 This remedy, however, is inadequate for a number of reasons. 
Injunctive relief is available for only two types of violations of the Pri-
vacy Act: the government refuses an individual access to her personal 
records or refuses to correct her personal records.523 Additionally, 
damages may be awarded for any other violation of the Privacy Act that 
has an “adverse effect” on an individual.524 The circumstances under 
which recovery is permitted, however, are limited.525 Plaintiffs must 
prove a “willful or intentional” violation of the Act.526 Plaintiffs must 
also show actual damages—and emotional damages alone generally do 
not count—before they can qualify for the Privacy Act’s minimum 
damages award of $1000.527 The real problem for enforcement, how-
ever, is that many privacy violations go undetected or do not result in 
injury traditionally recognized by the courts. If there were restrictions 
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on transferring personal data between intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies, and these were breached, it is unlikely that an individ-
ual would ever learn of the breach. If she did, she would be able to 
show damages only in the extreme circumstances of intrusive surveil-
lance or an arbitrary detention. Because of this mismatch between data 
privacy injuries and the common law’s remedial architecture, an inde-
pendent body with oversight and enforcement powers is essential. 
 An independent privacy agency would also foster greater transpar-
ency, public debate, and, yes, privacy, at the drawing board phase, at the 
time that new government initiatives are designed. Under the Privacy 
Act, government agencies are already required to publish Privacy No-
tices in the Federal Register when they plan on creating or modifying a 
system of records.528 A Privacy Notice must contain information on the 
type of personal data in the system, the purposes for which the data will 
be used, the security measures in place to protect the data, the other 
agencies with which the personal data will be shared, and the proce-
dures available to individuals to access and correct their records.529 The 
notice requirements could very well be expanded to include the steps 
that had been taken by the agency to ensure the necessity, relevance, 
and adequacy of the personal data, as well as to consider less privacy-
intrusive alternatives to the proposed system of records. With the fewer 
exceptions envisioned above, agencies would be required to provide 
this detailed explanation for a wider range of activities. An independ-
ent privacy agency would be in a position to provide an expert, impar-
tial analysis of the privacy implications of the proposed program. Fur-
thermore, in areas of government activity such as national security—in 
which disclosure can sometimes defeat the purposes of the government 
program—scrutiny by an independent agency would serve as a proxy 
for public debate. In other words, if secrecy is absolutely necessary, an 
independent privacy body would bring an important outsider perspec-
tive to an area of government activity that, by definition, cannot draw 
on the valuable insights of broad-ranging public scrutiny. 
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Conclusion 
 With the exception of an independent privacy agency, this Article’s 
proposed legal changes are modest. They draw on the European ex-
perience, yet they are thoroughly grounded in the text of the original 
Privacy Act. Even the creation of an independent privacy agency is con-
sistent with current trends in American law. Since September 11, a 
number of special-purpose privacy watchdogs have been created by 
Congress to address civil liberty concerns: the Chief Privacy Office in 
the Department of Homeland Security,530 the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Board in the Executive Office of the President,531 and the Civil Liber-
ties Protection Officer in the Office of the National Intelligence Direc-
tor.532 These civil liberties aims would be better achieved through a sin-
gle privacy watchdog, with powers extending to the entire federal ad-
ministration and with independence from the government officers in 
charge of privacy-burdening programs. 
 These improvements, in fact, would lead not only to better protec-
tion of privacy, but also to a more effective government response to the 
national security threat. In European eyes, such changes would consti-
tute a satisfactory guarantee that the privacy of European personal in-
formation will be protected once transferred to American authorities. 
This would facilitate tremendously the transatlantic exchange of intelli-
gence among government authorities. Thus, the borderless realm of 
twenty-first-century terrorism would be matched by public action also 
capable of overcoming the confines of the nineteenth-century nation 
state. 
                                                                                                                      
530 6 U.S.C. § 142 (Supp. III 2003 & Supp. IV 2004). For a comprehensive analysis of 
these privacy watchdogs, see generally Rotenberg, supra note 518. 
531 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
§ 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
532 Id. § 1011(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3d (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). 
